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Brendan S. Maher† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Benefit regulation has been called “the most consequential 
subject to which no one pays enough attention.”1 It exhausts 
judges, intimidates legislators, and scares off theorists.2 That 
need not be so. The reality is less complicated than advertised. 
Governments often consider intervention if markets fail to 
make some socially desirable Good X—such as education, 
health care, home mortgages, or pensions, for example—
sufficiently available. One obvious fix is for the government to 
provide the good itself. A less obvious intervention is for the 
government to regulate employment-based (EB) arrangements 
that provide Good X as a benefit to employees and their fami-
lies. In the United States, such employment-based interven-
tions are massive: they affect trillions of dollars, billions in tax 
 
†  Associate Professor and Robert D. Paul Scholar, University of Con-
necticut School of Law; J.D. Harvard Law School; A.B. Stanford University. 
Earlier drafts of this work were presented and received valuable criticism at 
three events. I would like to thank commenters from the 2014 Har-
vard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum (particularly Joseph Bankman); 
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larly Brian Galle). I would also like to thank—for everything—my father, Rob-
ert James Maher (19452014), who recently died after a long struggle with 
ALS. All errors are mine alone, Dad. Copyright © 2016 by Brendan S. Maher. 
 1. On March 22, 2013, the Michigan law, business, and graduate schools 
held a joint conference entitled “Regulation of Benefit Plans: The Most Conse-
quential Subject to Which No One Pays Enough Attention.” See Conference 
Schedule, U. Mich., Regulation of Benefit Plans: The Most Consequential Sub-
ject to Which No One Pays Enough Attention (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.bus 
.umich.edu/Conferences/US-Benefits-Law-A-Meta-Assessment/GetFile.aspx? 
paper_ord=635205.  
 2. Justice Souter apparently retired from the Supreme Court rather than 
adjudicate more ERISA cases. Jess Bravin & Evan Perez, Justice Souter To 
Retire from Court, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2009, at A1 (noting that one of Justice 
Souter’s reasons for retirement was a desire to be free of “numbingly technical 
cases involving applications of pension or benefits law”). 
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breaks, and millions of people.3 They have been written into 
federal law for decades and generate constant litigation before 
the United States Supreme Court.4 
Yet, while other regulatory interventions are well-
theorized, employment-based interventions are not. There is no 
coherent account of employment-based interventions as a con-
cept independent from the peculiarities of Good X or the rele-
vant implementing statutes. This is a significant failure, and 
 
 3. The numbers are staggering. At the end of 2013, private pension as-
sets totaled approximately 8 trillion dollars. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1, FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THIRD QUARTER 2014, 84 tbl.L.117 (2014) 
(reporting the value of both “defined benefit” and “defined contribution” plan 
assets). And annual funding and paying for all employee benefits (not just re-
tirement) totaled almost 3 trillion dollars in 2010, the last year in which relia-
ble estimates are available. See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI 
DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ch.2 (2012) (on file with author) (provid-
ing an annual contribution and expenditure estimate of $2.8 trillion for 2010).  
Approximately 150 million and 60 million people receive EB health and 
retirement benefits, respectively. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO AND JCT’S 
ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON THE NUMBER 
OF PEOPLE OBTAINING EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE tbl.2 (2012), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43082 (estimating that over 150 million people 
would receive EB insurance in 2012); Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Re-
tirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2012, EBRI 
ISSUE BRIEF, Nov. 2013, at 1, http://www.ebri.org/ pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_011 
-13.No392.Particip.pdf (indicating that there were 61.6 million beneficiaries of 
EB retirement benefits in 2012). Because many EB arrangements are tax-
favored, the tax expenditure associated with them is very high: projected to be 
almost 3% of the nation’s GDP over the 2013–2022 period. See Tax Expendi-
tures Have a Major Impact on the Federal Budget, CBO BLOG (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42919 (estimating tax revenue loss for EB re-
tirement and insurance plans).  
 4. The seminal statute is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26 & 29 U.S.C.). Legal recognition of EB approaches occurred before 
that, of course, but ERISA is the landmark statute. See, e.g., PRIVATE PEN-
SIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES vii (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2004) (“Tax incen-
tives for employer-based pensions originated in 1921.”).  
Since 2004 alone, the Supreme Court has decided fourteen ERISA cases. 
See Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014); Heimeshoff 
v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. 
McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 
(2011); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (2010); 
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for 
DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009); Metro. Life Ins. v. Glenn, 554 
U.S. 105 (2008); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248 
(2008); Beck v. Pace Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96 (2007); Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic 
Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200 (2004); Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004); Ray-
mond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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one that has obscured clear thinking on the subject for decades. 
This Article offers a simple theory of employment-based inter-
ventions that (1) explains the common conceit of all such inter-
ventions and (2) provides a non-technical framework for evalu-
ating any particular intervention, regardless of Good X.  
The gist of the theory (which for convenience I call “EB 
theory”) is easily stated. Regulatory interventions occur be-
cause the government concludes there is a problem with the 
quantity, quality, or distribution of Good X; employment-based 
interventions occur because the government believes regulating 
the labor deal is an attractive way to fix it. EB theory offers a 
systematic way for observers to determine whether the gov-
ernment is right. In so doing, EB theory makes the relative ap-
peal (or insufficiency) of employment-based interventions vast-
ly easier to understand. It also brings order and lucidity to a 
famously untidy subject. By gathering under the same tent ob-
servations made across eras and disciplines, by laying bare as-
sumptions about the “right” way to provide certain goods, and 
by suggesting promising paths for reform, EB theory promotes 
clarity in the national conversation.  
*** 
Part I provides some brief but necessary background. It 
supplies a short history of EB interventions in the United 
States, and considers the relevant features of the two most im-
portant federal EB statutes: the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA).5  
Even though employment-based interventions can include 
a variety of socially desirable goods, the original Good X, as 
Part I explains, was pensions. Abstract thinking was largely 
trained on questions peculiar to pensions, rather than on the 
inherent consequences of conscripting the employment bargain 
to convey some socially desirable Good X beyond wages. No or-
ganized attempt to theorize the latter appears in the literature. 
That pattern repeated for the second great Good X: health care. 
Intense criticism has been leveled at EB health care approach-
es, but with little consideration that such problems could be 
predictable manifestations of EB interventions generally. The 
 
 5. The Affordable Care Act is actually two pieces of legislation: the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. I follow custom by referring to them both as the 
“ACA.” 
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ACA, while signaling continuing legislative fascination with EB 
interventions, has prompted little general theorizing on EB in-
terventions beyond their role in health care. 
Part II pivots from the historical to the conceptual to offer 
a theory of EB interventions. The theory identifies the essential 
characteristics of EB interventions and builds a vocabulary to 
describe their advantages and disadvantages. The theory next 
evaluates in depth those advantages and disadvantages. 
Part II.A offers a simple conceptualization: an EB inter-
vention is a legislative decision to improve Good X by use of the 
labor deal. This conceptualization incorporates two key premis-
es: first, that the market has failed to optimize the quality, 
quantity, or distribution of Good X, and second, that it is desir-
able to improve Good X through regulation of the employment 
relationship. Part II.A also describes common variations in the 
implementation of EB interventions. 
Part II.B considers why EB approaches might be justified. 
It builds the preliminary case for EB interventions by asking 
what Good X would look like in “the baseline world,” i.e., an 
unregulated market, and imagining how an EB intervention 
might improve things. Compared to the baseline, EB interven-
tions admit of three potential advantages: (1) the use of sophis-
ticated parties to aid employees in obtaining Good X; (2) the 
power of groups in purchasing Good X; and (3) use of the com-
pensation deal as a natural decision point to promote Good X 
acquisition and planning. 
Comparison of EB interventions with other regulatory so-
lutions is more difficult, because a conclusive comparison de-
pends on the details of those competing options. One can, how-
ever, identify intuitive advantages EB interventions might 
have over other families of regulatory solutions. Part II.B iden-
tifies two. First, the labor deal seems a robust regulatory tar-
get. People need to make these deals and will have trouble 
abandoning them merely because of some additional regulatory 
burden. Employers, moreover, are familiar with serving as 
compliance bureaucrats. Second, EB interventions are regula-
tory solutions that preserve a meaningful role for market forc-
es, and thus arouse less skepticism in many stakeholders than 
more invasive approaches.  
Part II.C builds the general case against EB interventions. 
Rarely will any seriously considered EB intervention make 
matters worse than the baseline world. Instead, the relevant 
brief against EB interventions consists of two strains of argu-
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ment. The first is that the purported advantages of EB inter-
ventions are weaker than they appear. The second is that there 
are good reasons to be skeptical of EB interventions compared 
to other regulatory alternatives designed to solve the problems 
of Good X.  
Stated briefly, little is to be gained from using employers 
and the labor deal as a regulatory nexus. Employers are not, on 
matters of Good X, meaningfully sophisticated; their expertise 
lies elsewhere. Extensive regulation will likely be necessary to 
prevent employers from making unwise decisions regarding 
Good X, particularly when non-expert employers engage truly 
sophisticated third-party providers of Good X, as they often 
will. To the extent employers are more sophisticated on Good X 
than workers, extensive regulation will be needed to prevent 
employers from taking advantages of employees, with whom 
they have, on the matter of compensation, an adversarial and 
unbalanced relationship. The likely quantum of regulation 
needed to mitigate potential employer incompetence or exploi-
tation suggests that a more direct solution—cutting out em-
ployers and directly regulating the providers of Good X—may 
be preferable to an EB intervention.  
EB interventions also suffer from two more subtle nega-
tives. The first, regulatory fragility, comes from the strategic 
advantage employers have by being able to deliver a Good X 
marginally better than the baseline world. Regulatory efforts to 
improve Good X will be bound by employer threats to no longer 
offer Good X, a threat that increases in magnitude the worse 
the baseline world is. Given that an EB intervention is justified 
in the first instance by some problem with Good X in the base-
line world, this threat will virtually always have currency. It 
gains further power still when employers remind regulators 
that they are not, generally speaking, in the business of provid-
ing Good X. Such incidental providers of Good X are those we 
would most expect to abandon doing so if the going gets rough. 
The second subtle negative, opacity, operates to confuse 
stakeholders about who, precisely, is paying for Good X (and at 
what cost), and thus impedes accurate consideration of alterna-
tive solutions that are more transparent about the cost of Good 
X. EB interventions also promote the mistaken belief that Good 
X is an employment issue, rather than a social issue. EB inter-
ventions, however, are simply ways to solve problems with 
Good X. They signify no deeper relationship between employ-
ment and Good X.  
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Part III demonstrates the utility of EB theory. The theory 
establishes and explains EB interventions as a distinct species 
of regulatory intervention, with identifiable traits. It therefore 
immediately makes coherent the inquiry into the merits of any 
proposed EB intervention. What is the problem with Good X 
that demands action? How will regulating the labor deal ame-
liorate the problem? Is the ameliorative rationale based on em-
ployer sophistication, group advantage, the behavioral effects of 
tweaking the compensation bargain, or some combination 
thereof? Will an EB approach lead to a deteriorating equilibri-
um, i.e., where the alternative world of Good X is so undesira-
ble that regulators have little leverage? How tolerable is the 
opacity that plagues many EB interventions?  
Not only does the theory promote fruitful comparison of EB 
solutions to other regulatory approaches, it distinguishes 
among possible EB interventions. For example, ERISA might 
be undesirable, but perhaps some other version of an EB re-
tirement intervention is superior to both ERISA and its non-EB 
regulatory competitors. EB theory provides a roadmap for both 
types of inquiry. 
Importantly, the answers to the questions EB theory poses 
are not pre-ordained. They depend on the empirical judgment 
and priorities of those doing the asking. That important caveat 
aside, in Parts III.A, III.B, and III.C, I briefly consider some 
specific implications of EB theory.  
Part III.A uses EB theory to identify a potentially promis-
ing path for reform. A perhaps under-appreciated strength of 
EB interventions is their ability to promote “segregative push-
es.” Segregative pushes segregate a portion of wages and com-
mit employees to spending those funds on Good X. A 
segregative push combined with a particular style of regula-
tion—a “conduit” approach—might be the breed of EB interven-
tion most likely to capture the attention of sincere reformers. A 
conduit system is one in which the primary role of the employer 
is to transparently withhold and transfer some amount of the 
employee’s pay to an account that the employee can only spend 
in a regulated, non-EB market for Good X. Conduit systems 
combine the attractive front-end aspects of EB approaches with 
a regulated but private non-EB market on the back end. Fur-
ther study by scholars is warranted.  
Part III.B uses EB theory to shed light on ERISA and the 
ACA, suggesting comprehensible narratives for two infamously 
complex statutes. ERISA is a statute that underestimated the 
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dangers of conscripting the labor deal as a regulatory nexus, 
and fell victim to regulatory fragility. The ACA is a statute that 
attempted to create a non-EB market for health insurance 
while simultaneously choosing, perhaps for political reasons, to 
perpetuate an EB approach. The latter decision is certain to be 
reexamined in the not-distant future.  
Part III.C uses EB theory to offer a very short thought ex-
periment about why education is a good provided outside of 
employment, and what it may say about the degree to which 
our views of EB interventions are colored by hidden assump-
tions, which may or may not survive more considered analysis.  
Part III.D shifts from the specific to the general and ex-
plains the broad value—to scholars, decision-makers, and 
stakeholders—in having an accessible EB theory. One pleasing 
side effect of EB theory is that it organizes a great mass of 
seemingly unrelated scholarship (on pensions, health care, in-
surance, disability, and so on) that stretches back over a centu-
ry. It is also a crucial first step in dispelling the fog that im-
pairs mainstream understanding and discussion of EB 
approaches. Rarely has a mechanism so central to the processes 
of everyday life been shrouded in mystery and obscurity for so 
long. Understanding is valuable in and of itself, but particular-
ly so when the subject is something that touches so many dol-
lars and so many lives. 
I.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND   
The story of EB interventions in the United States can be 
told in three parts. The first part traces the organic, unregulat-
ed rise of employment-based retirement and health care ap-
proaches. The second part is the enactment of ERISA, which 
governs most private EB arrangements. The third part is the 
enactment of the ACA, which regulates EB health arrange-
ments. Missing from the story is any overarching theory about 
EB interventions. 
I should offer an important clarification. Other goods be-
yond health care and retirement income have been, could be, or 
are provided through EB arrangements. For example, one very 
important good provided in significant part through an EB 
model is disability insurance, i.e., wage replacement for those 
who cannot work because of a disability. And one good that 
could conceivably be provided through an EB approach, but is 
not, is unemployment insurance, i.e., temporary wage replace-
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ment for involuntary loss of employment.6 Retirement and 
health care, however, are the two most important EB goods in 
America, as well as the ones that best convey the necessary 
background in advance of the theoretical analysis offered in 
Parts II and III.  
 A. HISTORY (PRE-1974) 
The history of EB interventions orbits around two familiar 
things: retirement and health care. While today those subjects 
are on the minds of every aging voter and ambitious politician, 
in historical terms they are relatively recent problems. The EB 
story begins with retirement. 
Retirement. Retirement income, broadly, includes any in-
come one relies upon after aging out of the workforce. Original-
ly, however, the conception of retirement income was narrower: 
the pension. A pension is a fixed stipend paid by the govern-
ment or one’s former employer. Pensions assumed social signif-
icance during the late 19th century.7 Prior to that, most work-
ers were farmers or artisans who participated in family 
businesses; if they lived long enough, they relied on younger 
relatives to continue the business and provide for them in se-
nescence. As people began to work for enterprises they did not 
own (and began to live long enough to survive their careers), 
the need for post-employment income became apparent.8 
Pensions—a temporal transfer of wages—were a market 
reaction to a workforce with a post-employment need. As work-
ers realized the need for retirement income, the promise of a 
pension advantaged employers in the labor market. Pensions 
also appealed to employers for their own benefit, because pen-
sions encouraged employees to make firm-specific investments 
of human capital that benefited employers.9 Pension arrange-
 
 6. See infra note 184. 
 7. Civil War veterans received government pensions for service, and in 
1875, American Express offered the first private pension. See Peter Blanck & 
Chen Song, “Never Forget What They Did Here”: Civil War Pensions for Get-
tysburg Union Army Veterans and Disability in Nineteenth-Century America, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1116 (2003) (describing the Civil War pension 
intervention); STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 23 (1997) (describing the American Express pension).  
 8. See SASS, supra note 7, at 10–25; see also DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 46 (9th ed. 2010) (discussing the 
transformation of the American labor force in the late nineteenth century). 
 9. MCGILL ET AL., supra note 8, at 23; see also JONATHAN BARRY 
FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 225 (2006) (explaining that a pension plan 
will typically “provide large financial incentives for workers to stay with a firm 
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ments, moreover, helped increase voluntary departure when 
the employee’s productivity declined due to age.10 Voluntary 
departure is for employers preferable to termination because 
the former furthers amicable relations with the workforce. 
It soon became clear that unregulated private pensions 
were insufficient to provide adequate retirement security for 
workers or, obviously, for the citizenry as a whole.11 The pre-
World War II solution to the problem was to sidestep EB inter-
ventions entirely; the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 
provided broad-based government support for retired and disa-
bled Americans.12 
The passage of the Social Security Act, however, did not 
obviate the need or desire for workplace pensions. Other fac-
tors, such as the steady increase of income tax rates, as well as 
the wage and price controls of World War II, increased the ap-
peal of EB pensions. Indeed, employee (and union) realization 
of the tax benefits and inherent value of occupational pensions 
contributed to their sharp rise in the 1950s and 1960s.13 By 
1974, almost thirty million workers (approximately forty-four 
 
at least until they are eligible for early retirement”). 
 10. MCGILL ET AL., supra note 8, at 6; see LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Our New 
Peonage: Discretionary Pensions, in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 65, 67 (Small, 
Maynard & Co. 1914) (explaining the desire of employers to use pensions to 
amicably hasten departure of aged employees from the workforce). 
 11. See, e.g., Economic Security Act of 1935: Hearing on H.R. 4120 Before 
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 74th Cong. 219–21 (1935) (statement of Mur-
ray Latimer, Chairman, Railroad Retirement Board), http://www.ssa.gov/  
history/pdf/hr35latimer.pdf (testifying as to the inadequacy of the private pen-
sion intervention and the pressing need for enactment of what would become 
Social Security). See generally MURRAY W. LATIMER, INDUSTRIAL PENSION 
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1932) (examining and criticiz-
ing the private pension system). 
 12. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 7). Social Security was amended in 1939 
to resemble more closely what it is today. See Kathryn L. Moore, An Overview 
of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the Principles and Values 
It Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 8 (2011) (explaining the Social Secu-
rity Act Amendments of 1939). Interestingly, a rarely discussed historical fact 
is that an EB “opt-out” was rejected by the 74th Congress. See Tamela D. 
Jerrell, A History of Legally Required Employee Benefits: 19001950, 3 J. 
MGMT. HIST. 193, 199–200 (1997) (discussing the failed Clark Amendment, a 
proposed amendment to the Social Security Act allowing companies who pro-
vided comparable retirement benefits to opt out of the federal system).  
 13. See Alfred M. Skolnik, Private Pension Plans, 1950–74, 39 SOC. SECU-
RITY BULL. 3, 4 (1976), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v39n6/ 
v39n6p3.pdf (reporting that the percentage of private sector workers covered 
by pension plans grew from 22% in 1950 to 44% in 1974). 
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percent of the private sector workforce) were covered by pen-
sion plans.14 
By the 1960s, however, the uniformly good economic news 
of post-World War II America began to change for the worse, 
and pensions became a source of concern. Knowledgeable ob-
servers warned of an emerging pension crisis, in which difficult 
economic circumstances would undermine promises made in 
headier times. Congressional study of the problem began in 
earnest and would reach fruition the following decade with the 
passage of ERISA in 1974.15 
Health care. The other key subject in the history of EB in-
terventions is health care. The relative sophistication of mod-
ern medicine makes it difficult to forget how recently medicine 
was a primitive enterprise. The germ theory of sickness was 
not widely accepted until the later stages of nineteenth centu-
ry; more Civil War soldiers, for example, perished from disease 
and illness than enemy weaponry.16 Subsequent advancement 
of medical knowledge, however, led to confidence that purchas-
ing medical services was worthwhile.17  
In the 1860s, several companies experimented with provid-
ing “sickness funds” for injured workers.18 In the 1870s, other 
companies that required physically demanding and dangerous 
work—such as railroads, mines, and manufacturers—began 
providing company physicians to workers (for deducted wag-
es).19 Successful direct maintenance of these programs proved 
challenging.20 
 
 14. Id. at 4 tbl.1 (reporting data on the number of private pension partici-
pants). 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Kumanan Wilson, A Legal and Epidemiolog-
ical Justification for Federal Authority in Public Health Emergencies, 52 
MCGILL L.J. 381, 400 n.65 (2007) (“[I]t was not until the nineteenth century 
that scholars such [as] John Snow, Louis Pasteur, and Robert Koch estab-
lished the precepts of epidemiology, vaccinology, and germ theory—and that is 
where the scientific understanding begins.”). Numerous casualty estimates of 
the Civil War rank disease as a killer of more people than battle. See, e.g., Wil-
liam H. Neinast, United States Use of Biological Warfare, 24 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1964) (estimating a disease to battle death ratio of 1.45 to 1). 
 17. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDI-
CINE 259–60 (1982) (discussing the improving effectiveness of, and confidence 
in, medical services in the early twentieth century). 
 18. See JOHN E. MURRAY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE: A 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL SICKNESS FUNDS 74–76 (2007). Several of the em-
ployers, interestingly, hoped to make a profit on the funds. Id. at 75. 
 19. See STARR, supra note 17, at 200. 
 20. One reason may have been the primitive state of risk classification at 
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Employers ultimately turned to insurance. In 1910, retail-
er Montgomery Ward engaged an insurance company to pro-
vide a group policy covering its employees for lost income asso-
ciated with illness, which is considered the first employment-
based policy of that kind.21 In Dallas in the 1920s, a group of 
schoolteachers contracted with Baylor University hospital to 
provide medical services to them at a fixed cost per member.22 
This arrangement, significantly, targeted and covered the pro-
vision of necessary care, rather than the replacement of lost in-
come.23  
Although famously successful elsewhere, 1930s reformers 
were unable to enact national health care legislation.24 That 
failure heightened the importance of the wage freezes instanti-
ated during World War II several years later. During the war 
years, employment-based health insurance was considered 
compensation not subject to wage controls.25  
After the war, organized labor began to demand health 
benefits as a matter of routine.26 Moreover, whereas early ver-
sions of medical insurance were tied to medical expenses that 
occurred because of accidents, in the post-war period insurers 
began to offer “major medical” insurance that covered all ail-
ments, whatever their cause.27 Such was a particularly attrac-
tive benefit for labor.28 By the time ERISA was enacted in 1974, 
 
the time; firms may have lacked the actuarial sophistication to properly price 
contributions. See MURRAY, supra note 18, at 75–76 (considering the failure of 
some early sickness funds). 
 21. See Laura A. Scofea, The Development and Growth of Employer-
Provided Health Insurance, 117 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4 (1994). 
 22. See id. at 5. 
 23. See id.; see also STARR, supra note 17, at 295. 
 24. Those efforts were, for political reasons, more tepid than the unsuc-
cessful efforts of Progressives some two decades earlier. Compare STARR, su-
pra note 17, at 243–52 (describing Progressive era proposals), with id. at 266–
69 (describing New Deal era proposals). Indeed, “[a] provision in the original 
Social Security bill calling merely for further study of the health insurance 
problem provoked so much controversy that it was deleted.” COMM. ON EM-
PLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, INST. OF MED., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH 
BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 64 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro 
eds., 1993). 
 25. See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: LEGAL AND REGULATORY PERSPEC-
TIVES 3–4 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2002) (explaining the relevance of wartime 
wage controls). 
 26. See Scofea, supra note 21. 
 27. Id. at 3–4. 
 28. See Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employment-Based Health In-
surance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 
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a significant percentage of workers were beneficiaries of EB 
health plans.29 Health care costs had also begun to rise, but the 
scale of the problem was not evident to those legislators who 
would draft ERISA.30 
B. ERISA  
As its name—the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974—suggests, ERISA’s central aim was to address the 
pension crisis of the 1960s and early 1970s.31 Pension promises 
were too frequently underfunded or broken, with workers left 
in the cold. ERISA was the congressional reaction.32 Although it 
preserved the voluntary nature of pension promises—an em-
ployer could choose to not offer a pension at all, or could choose 
to offer a pension modest in amount—ERISA otherwise exten-
sively regulated pension promises that were made so as to en-
sure they were kept. 
Central to ERISA was and is the idea of an employee bene-
fit “plan.” As the statute has it, an employer who wishes to offer 
Good X in the labor deal must do so via a plan.33 A plan is both 
an entity and the sum of the terms governing the promised 
benefit. Employers need to appoint a “named fiduciary” to op-
erate the plan and observe demanding ERISA-imposed duties 
designed to ensure loyalty, care, and candor.34 Those fiduciary 
 
885, 891 (2011) (describing unions’ aggressive seeking of health benefits after 
World War II). 
 29. See Walter W. Kolodrubetz, Two Decades of Employee-Benefit Plans, 
195070: A Review, 35 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 10, 12 tbl.1 (1972) (reporting the 
number of beneficiaries for different varieties of EB health plans, including 
those covering hospitalization, surgery, and major medical expenses).  
 30. In the minds of the 93rd Congress, “there was no crisis in health plans 
in 1974.” Michael S. Gordon, Introduction to the Second Edition: ERISA in the 
21st Century, in EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW lxiii, lxviii (Steven J. Sacher et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2000). When ERISA was enacted, however, health costs were en-
tering a phase of rapid growth. See, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 4–5 (2012), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation 
.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7670-03.pdf (showing the rise in health care costs 
between 1960 and 2010); Kolodrubetz, supra note 29, at 15 (reporting that by 
1970 “[t]he inflation of medical costs . . . left its imprint on the rapidly increas-
ing [EB] expenditures for health care benefits”).  
 31. See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT IN-
COME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004). Wooten’s work is 
the definitive political history of ERISA. 
 32. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 451 (2010) (explaining that “the overwhelming focus 
of ERISA” was pension reform). 
 33. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(3) (2012). 
 34. Id. § 1102(a)(1)–(2) (describing the requirement for and definition of a 
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duties extend beyond the named fiduciary; they extend to any 
additional party who performs certain broadly defined acts 
with respect to the plan.35  
Importantly, ERISA contemplated two types of plans: 
“pension plans” and “welfare plans.” Pension plans provide for 
retirement income.36 Welfare plans are those plans that provide 
for anything else ERISA covers, including health care, disabil-
ity compensation, and long term care insurance.37 
Pension plans come in two varieties: “defined benefit”38 and 
“defined contribution.”39 A defined benefit plan is what most 
people think of as a traditional pension, i.e., where the worker 
is entitled to a fixed periodic (usually monthly) payment based 
upon tenure and average pay. Defined contribution plans are 
those plans that provide for the employer and/or employee to 
“contribute” some amount to an account the employee may only 
use for retirement income, e.g., a 401(k) plan. When ERISA 
was enacted in 1974, defined benefit plans—i.e., traditional 
pensions—dominated the retirement landscape.40 Defined con-
tribution plans existed but were far less popular than they are 
today.41  
 
named fiduciary); id. § 1104 (detailing the fiduciary duties). 
 35. Id. § 1002(21)(A). The term “fiduciary” is defined in functional terms; 
it includes any party who “has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration” of a plan. Id. 
 36. Id. § 1002(2)(A) (defining “pension plan” as “any plan, fund, or pro-
gram which . . . (i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a 
deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of 
covered employment or beyond”). 
 37. Id. § 1002(1) (defining “welfare plan” as one providing “medical, surgi-
cal, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, 
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or 
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid le-
gal services”). 
 38. Id. § 1002(35). 
 39. Id. § 1002(34).  
 40. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., PRIVATE 
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 1975–2013, at 14 
tbl.E11g (2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf (graphing the 
amount of assets in defined benefit versus defined contribution plans from 
1975 to 2013). 
 41. See id.; cf. Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Com-
pensation and Pension Contracts, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1251, 1252 (2004) (“401k 
plans have dominated pension growth for the past twenty years . . . .”). Indeed, 
in the common vernacular today, the word “pension” generally only means a 
defined benefit plan; a “retirement account” is the term commonly used for de-
fined contribution plans. Few would describe their 401(k) accounts as their 
“pension.” To be clear, however, ERISA considers both of them “pensions.” 
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This small bit of ERISA jargon is necessary to appreciate 
the tenor of ERISA’s regulatory scheme. ERISA very carefully 
conceived of and regulated “defined benefit” pensions.42 A pen-
sion is an annuity, i.e., a promise of a periodic payment begin-
ning in the future. If that annuity promise is unfunded, under-
funded, or funded via reserves an employer can withdraw at its 
discretion, the security of the pension is compromised. ERISA 
accordingly requires that “defined benefit” pension promises be 
backed by funds segregated in a trust, and specifically regu-
lates who can touch those funds, how they can be used, and 
what need or can be said about them.43 Questions not addressed 
by such specific rules are resolved with reference to the fiduci-
ary duties of plan fiduciaries. Finally, defined benefit plans are 
(partially) insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion (PBGC).44 
For employee benefits other than traditional pensions, i.e., 
for defined contribution retirement plans and welfare plans, 
ERISA regulation is of a more modest character. It consists of 
fewer specific rules (compared to those for pensions), with sig-
nificant if not most regulatory work to be done by the fiduciary 
duties the statute imposes upon those operating plans. If we 
imagine a spectrum, defined contribution plans are subject to 
fewer rules than defined benefit plans, with welfare plans 
(which includes health plans) subject to even fewer rules than 
are defined contribution plans. 
Observers have long focused on how well ERISA regulates 
a particular type of benefit arrangement. For example, ERISA 
generally gets good marks for its regulation of traditional pen-
sions; mixed marks for its regulation of retirement accounts; 
and terrible marks for its regulation of health and disability in-
surance.45 The conventional explanation for this divergence of 
 
 42. See, e.g., PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW 12 (2010) (remarking that the “most stringent regulation is re-
served for defined benefit pension plans”).  
 43. Specific provisions require, for example, that a certain amount of 
money be in the trust at all times, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1085; that benefits must 
accrue and vest on a certain schedule, id. §§ 1055, 1056(d)(1)–(3); that pension 
beneficiaries cannot have their pensions retroactively reduced, id. § 1054(g); 
that pension beneficiaries must be informed of funding and entitlement infor-
mation, id. §§ 1021(f), 1023, 1025; and so on. 
 44. Plan sponsors must pay premiums into the PBGC fund that protects 
workers if an underfunded plan collapses. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 42, at 
13. 
 45. See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: 
Will the Supreme Court Allow States To Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. 
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outcomes is that Congress, when it possessed the will to act in 
1974, focused on a then-significant pension problem and did not 
foresee the problems that would arise in the latter two areas. 
When those problems became apparent, the story goes, Con-
gress lacked the will to act. Few believe that Congress made a 
considered choice in 1974 to weakly regulate employee benefits 
other than pensions.46  
Because of ERISA’s checkered record—success on pensions, 
failure on health and disability—commentators have ques-
tioned whether it made (or makes) sense to regulate subjects so 
different in the same statute at all.47 And perhaps ERISA bit off 
more than it could chew. But there remains a basic intuition 
that ERISA’s architects got mostly right: namely, that EB ar-
rangements should be regulated, whatever the subject Good 
X.48 That intuition rests upon an assumption that EB bargains 
have some set of commonalities that transcend the specific na-
 
REV. 951, 953 (2000) (arguing that ERISA has completely failed as a consumer 
protection statute for welfare plan participants); Catherine L. Fisk, The Last 
Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure 
of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 36 (1996) (sharply criticizing ERISA’s 
effect on health care reform efforts); Maher & Stris, supra note 32, at 451–52 
(praising ERISA for its regulation of defined benefit pensions); David A. Pratt, 
Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 49 BUFF. L. 
REV. 741, 761 (2001) (suggesting the need for but criticizing the complexity of 
ERISA rules governing defined contribution plans); Edward A. Zelinsky, The 
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 522–23 (2004) (expressing 
concerns about ERISA’s regulation of retirement accounts but also suggesting 
advantages). Obviously I refer to what I perceive to be trends in the literature, 
not unanimity. 
 46. See, e.g., Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and the Health 
Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. 
REV. 355, 358–60 (1994) (explaining that the primary purpose of ERISA was 
to protect all benefit beneficiaries). 
 47. See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 32, at 473–74 (claiming ERISA is 
a “statutory conglomerate” that wrongfully uses a one-size-fits-all approach for 
different types of benefit promises). 
 48. To be clear, there are EB arrangements ERISA does not regulate. See 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 42, at 42–43. The statute nonetheless regulates such 
a broad swath of arrangements that the point is still valid. It is also possible 
that Congress, in essence, had no appreciation of any commonality between 
EB approaches and simply hashed together ERISA based on a shallow view of 
the past. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 311, 315 (1998) (speculating that Congress’s decision as to what to in-
clude in ERISA was more accident than considered intent). Whether Congress 
realized it or not, the point remains: there are commonalities in EB interven-
tions that suggest a simple unified framework for how they should be evaluat-
ed. 
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ture of the goods provided and demand regulatory interven-
tion.49 
No coherent explanation has ever been offered, however, as 
to what those EB commonalities are. The 93rd Congress, for its 
part, appeared motivated by a general sense that benefit prom-
ises made to employees should be kept, whatever the subject of 
the promise.50 That, while commendable, provides little help in 
methodically considering the pluses and minuses of deploying 
EB interventions across different settings. And it made it vir-
tually impossible for Congress to predict the serious problems 
that would arise in connection with defined contribution re-
tirement accounts or employment-based health care. 
C. ACA  
The two dominant models for paying for health care in the 
United States are the public “Medi-” model and the private in-
surance model.51 The poor and elderly use Medicaid or Medi-
care; most others use insurance to finance care. The insurance 
model has posed numerous problems of accessibility, affordabil-
ity, and comprehensibility. 
By largely barring risk underwriting by insurers while re-
quiring everyone to obtain insurance, the ACA reduced the ad-
verse selection problem that had distorted individual markets 
for health insurance.52 Whereas in the past some individuals 
with pre-existing conditions could not obtain insurance at any 
price, the ACA ensures access to insurance. Of course, because 
 
 49. This does not assume, however, that the content of the regulatory in-
tervention need be the same with respect to all goods. That was one of 
ERISA’s many failures. See, e.g., Maher & Stris, supra note 32, at 460 (ex-
plaining ERISA’s failure to sufficiently distinguish between welfare and pen-
sion plans). 
 50. See, e.g., WOOTEN, supra note 31, at 3–4 (describing Congress as 
adopting a “worker-security” rationale in enacting ERISA). 
 51. See Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Consti-
tution: How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 275, 282 (2013) (explaining and noting the prevalence of the 
“Medi-” and private insurance models). 
 52. One of Congress’s enumerated findings in enacting the ACA was that 
the individual mandate was “essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed 
issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.” 42 
U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (2012); cf. Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Gruber & Robin 
McKnight, The Importance of the Individual Mandate—Evidence from Massa-
chusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293–95 (2011) (explaining the reduction 
in premiums in Massachusetts after implementing the purchase mandate 
there). 
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health insurance (even without adverse selection distortions) is 
expensive, the ACA extends purchase subsidies to poor individ-
uals.53 Finally, because the purchase of health insurance can be 
a difficult task, the ACA created “exchanges” in which potential 
insureds could meaningfully comparison shop among regulated 
alternatives and choose the policy that matched their prefer-
ences.54 
Whatever the shortcomings in the ACA’s execution, the in-
tent of the Act was clear: it aimed to create an accessible, af-
fordable, and stable market for individuals seeking health in-
surance. That created an interesting tension with the ERISA-
inspired EB health insurance system in place at the time of the 
ACA’s enactment. In the past, because of the failures of the in-
dividual market, many employees who wanted insurance could 
only reasonably obtain it if offered as an employee benefit.55 Not 
offering health insurance could damage employers by driving 
away employees who wanted it; in that sense, employers were 
compelled, because of labor market pressures, to offer health 
insurance as a benefit. However, to the extent that the ACA 
created an alternative place to obtain health insurance bene-
fits—namely, the ACA’s regulated individual market—would 
employers stop offering health benefits? 
The ACA presumes so, although its treatment of the sub-
ject is uneven. As written, it provides obstacles to certain em-
ployers wishing to cease offering health insurance.56 Employers 
with less than fifty employees may, without penalty, decline to 
 
 53. See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-
Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1947–48 (2013) (explaining 
ACA purchase subsidies). 
 54. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Some Thoughts on Health Care Exchang-
es: Choice, Defaults, and the Unconnected, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2012) 
(stating that one aim of the ACA exchanges was to make insurance purchases 
“simple and transparent”); cf. Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Un-
derstanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 
UCLA L. REV. 394, 407 (2014) (“[E]mpirical evidence suggests that exchanges 
can be quite effective at promoting transparent markets.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United 
States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 574–77 (2008) (noting that the non-group 
insurance market “has not provided a very hospitable environment” and that 
the high cost of health insurance is a large reason for uninsurance). 
 56. I say “as written” because, at the time of this writing, regulatory offi-
cials have suspended various portions of the Act. See, e.g., Shared Responsibil-
ity for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8543 (Feb. 12, 
2014) (delaying in part the application of the ACA’s “shared responsibility 
provision” for employers). 
  
1274 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1257 
 
offer health insurance.57 Employers with fifty employees or 
more, however, face a penalty if they do not offer health insur-
ance to employees.58 Wisely or not, the ACA contemplates keep-
ing some portion of the EB health insurance intervention in-
tact. It also regulates the substance of some EB health 
insurance policies differently and less invasively than non-EB 
policies.59 
A careful theoretical justification of why—absent political 
convenience—the ACA should do what it ultimately did never 
appeared in the run-up to reform. And many of the criticisms of 
EB health insurance made preceding the passage of the ACA 
turn out, in significant part, to be predictable manifestations of 
EB theory.60 
D. A LACK OF THEORY 
In spite of the existence of two massive federal statutes 
regulating EB arrangements, neither has prompted the articu-
lation of any general theory about the construct they regulate. 
Its broad coverage of EB activities notwithstanding, ERISA 
did not address itself, either in enactment or the run-up there-
to, to advancing a more general theory of EB interventions. In-
deed, at the time of its passing, ERISA’s effects on Goods X be-
yond retirement income were only barely appreciated.61 Even 
 
 57. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012).  
 58. Id. § 4980H(a) (detailing the “shared responsibility” provision). The 
size of the penalty varies. See Moore, supra note 28, at 903–06 (explaining op-
eration of the penalty). The ACA also continues to provide tax advantages to 
EB health insurance that it does not provide to the individual purchase of in-
surance. See Stephen Utz, The Affordable Care Act and Tax Policy, 44 CONN. 
L. REV. 1213, 1233–34 (2012) (explaining disparate tax treatment of EB health 
insurance and individual health insurance). 
 59. For example, large employers do not need to offer policies that contain 
“essential health benefits,” the statute’s central substantive effort to regulate 
the content of health insurance policies. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a) (2012) (provid-
ing that only individual and small group plans must provide “essential health 
benefits”). See also Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Un-
dermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 
147–48 (2011) (“[N]either large group insurance plans nor self-insured em-
ployers are required by ACA to offer essential health benefits to their policy-
holders.”). 
 60. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes.  
 61. This is one reason why scholars have described ERISA’s treatment of 
health insurance as an “afterthought.” See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two 
Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & 
ETHICS 23, 29 (2001) (“Health benefits were included in ERISA as an after-
thought . . . .”); cf. Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Lais-
sez-Faire Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 OHIO 
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with respect to retirement income, the statute’s conceptualizing 
was, given the realities of today, incomplete.62 The ACA demon-
strates a similar inchoateness with respect to any coherent the-
ory of EB interventions. It acknowledges and relies upon EB 
health insurance, but little more. 
Certainly many observers, across eras and disciplines, 
have criticized many aspects of EB approaches.63 There is vir-
tually no aspect of pensions, retirement accounts, health care, 
disability wage replacement, long term care insurance, or other 
plausible EB goods that has not been discussed, praised, or crit-
icized. Yet no effort has been made to cast those evaluations 
(whether criticism or praise) as part of a unifying EB frame-
work accessible across disciplines. In Part II, I develop one. In 
Part III, I consider its utility.  
II.  THEORIZING EB INTERVENTIONS   
In this Part II, I offer a conceptualization of EB interven-
tions that both defines what they are and crystallizes im-
portant questions about their use. In so doing, I identify and 
develop the rationales for and hazards of using EB interven-
tions, drawing upon real-world examples to illustrate the prin-
ciples at work. The enumerated justifications and hazards 
commonly recur across EB interventions but apply with vary-
ing intensity to different goods and across different statutory 
schemes. Accordingly, EB theory renders much more disci-
plined the consideration of any proposed EB intervention. 
 A. CONCEPTUALIZING EB INTERVENTIONS 
Simply stated, EB interventions are (1) government inter-
ventions that (2) regulate the inclusion of socially desirable 
 
ST. L.J. 153, 165–66 (1995) (explaining that Congress gave “relatively little 
thought” to welfare benefits).  
 62. Congress did not foresee the explosive growth of defined contribution 
plans. Indeed, Congress did not even clarify their tax treatment until 1978. 
See Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The 
IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1385 n.70 (1980) (explaining the uncertain 
tax status of “salary reduction plans” until the addition of section 401(k) to the 
IRC in 1978). 
 63. See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes. Treatments outside law 
often focus on the political motivations of different constituencies in address-
ing Good X problems through EB approaches (as opposed to other solutions). 
See, e.g., STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM 188–94 
(1976). 
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goods (3) in the labor deal struck between employees and em-
ployers.64  
By socially desirable goods, I refer to those goods for which 
there is broad agreement that society is better off if most indi-
viduals have or are able to obtain them. Education, health care, 
home mortgages, pensions, and life insurance are classic exam-
ples, although others can be readily imagined. Such goods are 
commonly held to have special significance because of supra-
economic concerns such as fairness, opportunity, dignity, com-
passion, and so on.  
The nature of the government intervention in the labor 
deal varies, but often includes both incentives and prohibitions. 
For example, employers and employees might be incented to 
bargain for pensions because doing so secures a tax advantage 
to one or both of them.65 The terms of the deals they strike, on 
the other hand, might be directly limited by substantive rule or 
indirectly limited by conditioning the tax break. 
Although both the mechanism and magnitude of regulatory 
intrusion will vary across EB interventions, the key point is 
that EB interventions rest upon government intervention in 
the labor deal. Interventions in markets are only sensible when 
there is some cognizable shortcoming with the market result.66 
I do not mean for this to be a controversial point. Markets ei-
 
 64. A word about vocabulary. If a good is provided incident to the labor 
deal but not regulated, we might think of that as an EB arrangement or bar-
gain (as opposed to an intervention). I think that should be obvious from con-
text, but I make the point in an abundance of caution. 
 65. The incentive to offer the social good in the labor deal does not have to 
be tax-based; it can come in other forms. But use of tax incentives is popular, 
and prompts a separate question. Assuming a given EB intervention (1) im-
proves Good X and (2) uses tax incentives, is the lost revenue associated with 
the tax incentive too high a comparative price to pay to obtain the alleged im-
provement of Good X? That is, might some other regulatory approach, i.e., di-
rect government provision of Good X, result in the same improvement of Good 
X with fewer tax dollars?  
I do not here try to answer the question of whether EB interventions get 
the most bang for the tax buck. In this Article, I merely attempt to determine 
how we might evaluate whether and how much Good X is in fact being im-
proved by a specific EB intervention. How high a tax price we should “pay” for 
obtaining that improvement is a question that requires a separate treatment 
(and comparison of the alternatives). I do think, however, that EB tax costs 
are—like other workings of EB interventions—often not clearly understood by 
stakeholders. Cf. infra Part III.C.3.d (discussing the undesirable opacity of EB 
interventions). I thank Joseph Bankman for his thoughtful comments on this 
point. 
 66. By “open market” I mean the unregulated buying and selling of goods 
by parties according to their means and preference. 
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ther get the right result—whatever one means by “right”—or 
they do not. Interventions only make sense in the latter case. 
Accordingly, for an EB intervention to be warranted, there 
must be some type of market inadequacy concerning Good X, 
i.e., the “normal” market must have in some way failed to op-
timize Good X. Sub-optimal outcomes can occur in a variety of 
ways, but it is conceptually convenient to think about them as 
happening with respect to the quantity, distribution, or quality 
of Good X.67 An EB intervention is therefore only sensible if use 
of the labor deal to regulate Good X will somehow “improve” the 
quantity, distribution, or quality of X. 
Thus, the necessary second step in thinking about any EB 
intervention—after we have identified a problem (or problems) 
with Good X—is to ask: why might the government believe 
Good X will be improved by regulating its inclusion in the labor 
deal? 
B. RATIONALIZING EB INTERVENTIONS 
1. The Baseline: Open Market Transactions for X 
First some table-setting. The notion that one might “im-
prove” a situation is comparative; one must be improving some 
situation relative to something else. Real world discussion of 
EB interventions is complicated (and often confused) by the 
status quo, which reflects a variety of preexisting regulatory in-
terventions that are both explicit and implicit. For now let us 
assume, for ease of analysis, that the baseline world is one in 
which individuals who want Good X obtain it through individu-
al, open market transactions with providers of Good X. 
Problems in such a world are not hard to imagine.68 Some 
people may not purchase Good X because they misunderstand 
its value. Some might be priced out of the Good X market. Some 
might purchase undesirable versions of Good X because they 
lack the sophistication to properly negotiate with Good X pro-
viders. Others might be discriminated against in their attempts 
to purchase Good X. And so on. The first order case for EB in-
 
 67. Quantity refers to the amount of Good X; distribution refers to the dis-
tribution of Good X throughout society; quality refers to the features of Good 
X. 
 68. Whether something is a problem depends on antecedent principles. 
But whatever the reason one believes there is a problem, for an EB interven-
tion to make even prima facie sense, it must do something to address that 
problem. 
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terventions revolves around their potential ability to address 
these inadequacies. 
2. The First Order Case for EB Interventions 
Three rationales comprise the prima facie case for EB in-
terventions: (1) the use of sophisticated actors; (2) the power of 
group leverage regarding Good X; or (3) the value of the labor 
deal as a “decision point” for Good X purchasing and planning. 
The rationales, of course, apply with different force depending 
on the nature of Good X and the contours of the relevant EB 
statute. 
a. Sophisticated Actors 
For some goods, market problems might directly result 
from the complicated nature of their particulars. Individuals 
might indefinitely delay purchasing Good X because the task is 
unpleasant or they are uncertain they can strike an appealing 
deal.69 Individuals might be unable or unwilling to invest the 
time to identify and compare Good X options.70 Individuals 
might purchase Good X but be exploited by more sophisticated 
providers such that they end up with a Good X of poor quality.71 
EB arrangements can address this problem by supplying 
sophisticated actors to aid employees in acquiring Good X, 
namely employers. The comparative sophistication of employ-
ers over employees is a generalization subject to innumerable 
qualifications (as I will discuss below).72 But in spelling out the 
base rationale here—that EB interventions are attractive on 
 
 69. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1, 1–19 (1991) (noting the frequency of procrastination with re-
spect to certain types of decisions, including saving for retirement); Brian Gal-
le, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 83 (2009) (“[T]here is now extensive 
evidence that most people are disproportionately sensitive to small, immediate 
costs; that is one of the reasons we procrastinate even essential tasks.”); Piers 
Steel, The Nature of Procrastination: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review 
of Quintessential Self-Regulatory Failure, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65, 66 (2007) 
(surveying explanations, models, and studies of procrastination). 
 70. Cf. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1095–100 (2000) (explaining difficulties in making health 
insurance selection decisions). 
 71. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (2008) (arguing that in the consumer credit context “sellers 
design their products to exploit consumers’ imperfect information and imper-
fect rationality”).  
 72. See infra Part II.C. 
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the grounds that they organically engage more sophisticated 
actors to purchase Good X on employees’ behalf—let us assume 
the term “employer” means “a firm of considerable size.” Com-
pared to an individual worker, we would expect such firms to 
have lower information costs regarding obtaining, understand-
ing, and acting on information related to Good X.73 
Employer resources are more flexible, and deeper, than 
that of individuals. Managers of the employer will often be 
more educated and better trained than non-managerial em-
ployees. The firm can devote a small percentage of its overall 
capacity to developing a familiarity with (if not a specialty) in 
Good X; in comparison an individual employee would need to 
devote a considerably larger percentage of his time.74 Employ-
ers have more capital and greater access to capital markets, 
which provides them with greater leverage and more credibility 
in dealing with the counterparties who wish to provide Good X. 
Employers are likely to be repeat players (with counterparties 
providing Good X) of significant size and secure associated 
transaction cost advantages.75 Employers, as institutional ac-
tors acting in a commercial capacity, may be less subject to 
cognitive biases than individuals attempting to acquire Good X 
on the side and in their spare time.76  
 
 73. This is one of ERISA’s beginning presumptions. See supra note 34. A 
plan sponsor—the employer—is originally the “named fiduciary” of the plan 
unless it designates someone else. It makes little sense to designate an actor a 
fiduciary relative to another unless the former has at least a peppercorn more 
capability than the latter. 
 74. Cf. Hyman & Hall, supra note 61, at 30 (arguing that, with respect to 
health insurance decisions, employers have superior personnel resources). 
 75. Cf. Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 
(Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake 
of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 619–24 
(discussing the advantages of repeat-players in negotiating contracts and in 
dispute resolution settings). 
 76. Certainly employers and institutions are subject to cognitive biases. 
The argument is that in comparison to individual employees operating outside 
of an EB intervention (who are in essence consumers), employers acting insti-
tutionally are less subject to cognitive biases. See Donald C. Langevoort, Be-
havioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A 
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1515 (1998) (“Because corporations 
and other business associations are so subject to market constraints, there 
have been long-standing doubts as to whether psychological biases, even if ro-
bust at the individual level, are likely to have much impact on organized eco-
nomic behavior.”); see also Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organi-
zational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (1998). 
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Assuming the employer is appropriately incented, we can 
imagine two ways in which their comparative sophistication 
might improve Good X. The first is direct agency: the employer 
will strike more or better deals for Good X with providers of 
Good X than employees would have on their own. The second is 
indirect agency: the employer will use its sophistication to 
guide employee acquisition of Good X such that the employee is 
a wiser purchaser. Either represents an improvement com-
pared to the baseline. 
b. Group Leverage 
A common market problem is that a good is too expensive 
for some who need it. EB approaches can address part of this 
problem by leveraging the advantages that attach to group 
deals for certain goods. These group advantages come in two 
basic forms: (1) bulk purchasing and (2) group correctives. 
  i. Bulk Purchasing 
Bulk purchasing is straightforward. Purchases in larger 
lots can occur at lower unit cost, and employers would be pur-
chasing more of Good X at a given time than would individual 
workers on the open market. An employer of size would be able 
to obtain Good X at a lower cost than an equivalent number of 
employees purchasing Good X individually. The value and ap-
peal of bulk purchasing obviously varies depending on Good X 
and the size of the employer. But the principle is simple.77 
 ii. Group Correctives 
Group correctives are less straightforward. Some goods are 
subject to market infirmities that make non-group purchases 
highly expensive or impossible (because the necessary price 
would be so high that Good X providers do not even offer it). 
Use of a group as a purchasing or deal unit can “correct” some 
of these problems. 
Adverse selection. The most obvious and important salutary 
grouping function EB interventions serve is in minimizing ad-
verse selection. Adverse selection can occur in any situation in 
which, because of asymmetric information, one party assumes 
 
 77. The downside is equally simple: bulk purchasing reduces choice. Thus, 
the more important a choice is with respect to a particular Good X, the less of 
an advantage bulk purchasing will be. 
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more risk than she was able to price.78 That party will be the 
target of counterparties trying to get a favorable risk deal. 
Consider adverse selection in the insurance context. To be 
economically worthwhile for an insurance company, the ex-
pected payout on a policy must be less than the premiums due 
in the covered term (by an amount large enough to cover the 
insurance company’s overhead and generate a profit). If an in-
surer cannot adequately price the risk a potential insured pre-
sents, it will underprice the insurance policy, which will attract 
the highest risk customers. When the insurer raises prices to 
account for that possibility, insureds who pose the least risk 
(and thus who rationally wish to pay a small premium) will no 
longer buy insurance, leaving the insurer with a worse risk 
pool. Adverse selection can cripple unregulated insurance mar-
kets.79 
Adverse selection is more than an insurance problem. In 
the retirement context, for example, adverse selection may af-
flict the annuity market. A simple annuity promises monthly 
payments, commencing at some T0, to the recipient for life.
80 
The recipient trades a lump sum (the cost of the annuity) in re-
turn for a promise of lifelong monthly payments; whether that 
 
 78. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing 
the first formal treatment of adverse selection). Insurers had been using the 
term informally for decades. See, e.g., G.E. CURRIE, THE UNITED STATES IN-
SURANCE GAZETTE AND MAGAZINE OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE 132 (1869) (dis-
cussing adverse selection in life insurance policies). Professors Michael Roth-
schild and Joseph Stiglitz were the first to offer a formal model of how adverse 
selection would work in insurance markets. Michael Rothschild & Joseph 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Eco-
nomics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976). 
 79. The threat adverse selection poses to insurance markets varies and in 
many cases may be overstated. See generally Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selec-
tion in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) 
(concluding that propitious selection—an alternative method of selection—is 
at least as common as adverse selection). “Underwriting” is the process by 
which an insurer attempts to assess the risk of potential insureds and appro-
priately price policies, and underwriting is easier in some areas than others. 
Adverse selection in health insurance is assumed to be a more serious chal-
lenge than elsewhere because of difficulties in underwriting medical and 
treatment risk. Cf. Jayanta Bhattacharya & William B. Vogt, Employment 
and Adverse Selection in Health Insurance 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12430, 2006) (acknowledging a widespread belief by econ-
omists that employment “ameliorates the adverse selection problem in health 
insurance provision”). 
 80. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik, Protecting Our Aging Retirees: Convert-
ing 401(k) Accounts into Federally Guaranteed Lifetime Annuities, 47 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 277, 278 (2010) (explaining annuities). 
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is a happy deal for the issuer depends in part on the life expec-
tancy of the annuitant. Adverse selection can arise because an-
nuitants who expect to live a long time perceive annuities to be 
more attractive than annuitants who do not, and it is difficult 
for the annuity seller to adequately price the annuity to reflect 
differences in this underlying risk.81 
EB approaches address adverse selection by assembling 
the deal unit according to a factor that sorts independently of 
risk, i.e., a group of people that chose to work for the same em-
ployer. When an employer purchases Good X on behalf of a 
group—a group that exists independently of the desire of its 
members to purchase Good X—adverse selection is minimized 
because the larger the group, the more likely the group’s risk 
characteristics will correspond to the overall community’s risk 
characteristics (and thus be amenable to proper pricing).82 
Affordable averaging. EB interventions can also address 
the problem of “optimal but undesirable selection.” A simple 
example will suffice. Imagine ten persons who can afford to pay 
$100 for an insurance policy. Imagine further that the expected 
payout by the insurance company, on this group of persons, is 
$900. The insurer can write that group policy, collect $1000 in 
premiums, and make $100 to cover its overhead and earn some 
profit. 
Now imagine the same ten persons, except that the first 
five have ascertainable (to the insurance company) traits that 
make the expected payout on them $45 each (for a total of 
$225), whereas the second five have ascertainable (to the in-
surance company) traits that make the expected payout on 
them $135 each (for a total of $675). Assuming the insurance 
company needs a 10% margin above expected payout, it would 
be indifferent between writing the group policy in which each of 
the ten beneficiaries is charged $100, or ten individual policies 
 
 81. See Agar Brugiavini, Uncertainty Resolution and the Timing of Annui-
ty Purchases, 50 J. PUB. ECON. 31, 50 (1993) (offering an argument about ad-
verse selection in annuity markets); Martin Feldstein, Rethinking Social In-
surance 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11250, 2005) 
(considering adverse selection in annuity markets); cf. Michael D. Hurd, 
James P. Smith & Julie M. Zissimopoulos, The Effects of Subjective Survival 
on Retirement and Social Security Claiming (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9140, 2002) (investigating choices made by retirees regard-
ing when to accept Social Security).  
 82. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 61; see also Allison Hoffman, Oil and 
Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 
36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 28 (2010) (noting that there is “little concern of adverse 
selection with respect to large, employer-sponsored group insurance”). 
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in which the first five people are charged $55 and the second 
five are charged $145. The latter result is (for some observers) 
undesirable, however, because it now means that five people 
cannot afford insurance. 
EB interventions can resolve this problem by making, via 
regulation, the insurable unit the employee group and prohibit-
ing insurers from doing individual underwriting within the 
group.83 Thus, to insure the group (and get the business) insur-
ers must take the bad with good: the group rate insurers charge 
each group member is not enough to cover the bad risks in the 
group but it is too much to cover the good risks. The good risks 
“subsidize” the bad, which makes it feasible for the insurer to 
write a policy for the group that is affordable for all employees. 
This feature of EB interventions can be attractive even 
outside of insurance arrangements. Insurance settings often in-
crease the likelihood that employees will be pleased to partici-
pate (because they are unsure if or when they will become the 
bad risk that needs group averaging), but principles of solidari-
ty could justify voluntary cooperation in non-insurance set-
tings.84 
c. Natural Decision Point 
For some goods, market problems may be related to the 
contingent or long-term nature of the good. People may be so 
busy dealing with immediate needs and demands that they 
lack the time to consider whether they have suitably planned 
for the future (or possible futures). And to the extent a good 
that addresses a contingent or distant need is complicated in its 
particulars, that might fuel additional procrastination.85 Such 
familiar quirks of human decision-making might describe why, 
in the baseline world, even cognitively and economically capa-
ble people have declined to acquire Good X on the open market.  
 
 83. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 22, 27–28 (1971) (explaining in general terms why internal subsi-
dization will not survive in competitive markets absent regulation); see also 
Joseph P. Newhouse, Is Competition the Answer?, 1 J. HEALTH ECON. 110, 113 
(1982) (explaining how groups may disaggregate in the absence of constraining 
regulation). 
 84. See Moore, supra note 12, at 40–41 (discussing solidarity as a value). 
 85. See John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Re-
tirement Saving Outcomes: Evidence from the USA, in LESSONS FROM PENSION 
REFORMS IN THE AMERICAS 59, 74–75 (Stephen Kay & Tapen Sinha eds., 2008) 
(invoking the complexity of making a retirement savings decision as an expla-
nation for undersaving). 
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EB interventions that encourage the appending of Good X 
to the labor deal seem a good way to promote engagement by 
individuals on the matter of Good X; the government is essen-
tially saying, “When thinking about your wages, also think 
about Good X.”86 More people are likely to think more often, and 
with more care, about a good connected to a deal (the compen-
sation deal with their employer) that they are reminded of eve-
ry pay period. The baseline world provides no such consistent 
reminder. Obviously the value of such a reminder is modest if 
people have little ability to make and execute an advantageous 
deal for Good X, but it would be missing something to overlook 
the general value of reminders in improving outcomes. 
This rather old and simple intuition—that people think 
more about issues put before them and vastly less about equal-
ly important issues not put before them—is today a part of a 
much larger literature on how people behave (or misbehave) 
when making decisions.87 The teachings of behavioral econom-
ics, although only widely known well after the rise of EB inter-
ventions, provide additional warrant for their use. EB interven-
tions plausibly can, in fairly seamless ways, help correct 
cognitive biases that would undermine optimal decision-
making in the baseline world (and beyond simply reminding 
otherwise capable people to think about Good X).88  
As many might know from disappointing personal experi-
ence, people have trouble keeping promises to themselves, even 
 
 86. Obviously this depends on the degree to which the EB intervention in 
practice makes salient the Good X decision or choice it hopes to direct the em-
ployee’s attention to; clearly, some EB interventions will in their particulars 
be better than others at focusing the attention of employees on Good X. The 
general point is that the paycheck is a thing people naturally pay some atten-
tion to. 
 87. See generally DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN 
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008) (arguing that a greater under-
standing of the emotions and social norms that influence economic behavior 
improves our ability to examine motivation and consumer choice, as well as 
economic and educational policy); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND 
SLOW (2011) (exploring what influences thought). 
 88. A cognitive bias is a habitual error in thinking made in certain cir-
cumstances that results in choices which fail to maximize a person’s welfare. 
See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (“Actual judgments [of human beings] show 
systematic departures from models of unbiased forecasts, and actual decisions 
often violate the axioms of expected utility theory.”). Behavioral economists 
have spent much of the last three decades identifying and defining the cata-
logue of biases that afflict us, as well as the circumstances in which such bias-
es are likely to play significant roles. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
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when they know doing so will improve their welfare.89 Relying 
on others to help ourselves keep our promises is an ancient no-
tion—Odysseus used his crew to prevent himself from falling 
victim to the sirens—but is more valuable than ever today, 
when numerous desirable outcomes, e.g., losing weight or quit-
ting smoking, depend on performing promises to oneself. An EB 
intervention that segregates and blocks wages from being used 
for anything other than Good X is the modern version of Odys-
seus’ crew.90 
As a final example, consider how the cognitive biases of de-
fault bias and hyperbolic discounting might stand as argu-
ments in favor of using an EB intervention. Default bias is a 
label for the phenomenon that most persons attribute too much 
weight to a default choice, meaning they select it over compet-
ing choices more often than they should.91 Hyperbolic discount-
ing refers to overly discounting the future in favor of the pre-
sent; we are naturally grasshoppers rather than ants.92 To the 
extent that an EB intervention can provide, as part of the labor 
deal, a desirable default—such as a retirement investment op-
tion that engages in rational discounting with respect to re-
tirement income—the policy appeal is that enormous numbers 
of employees will be more likely to avoid hyperbolic discounting 
mistakes they would have made in the baseline open market 
world.93 Other salutary implementations of behavioral econom-
ics through EB interventions are readily imaginable.94 
 
 89. See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or 
Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999) (examining self-control problems and 
commitment devices).  
 90. The Odysseus metaphor is common. See, e.g., Angela Littwin, Beyond 
Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Con-
sumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 470 (2008) (discussing commitment devices using 
the Odysseus crew metaphor). 
 91. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 300 (4th ed. 2008). 
 92. See George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will As Intertemporal Bar-
gaining: Implications for Rationality, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 830–31 (2003) 
(discussing hyperbolic discounting and noting that such decision-making is 
regularly demonstrated across contexts); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen 
Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905, 
913–14 (describing hyperbolic discounting and providing examples of the phe-
nomenon). For those not familiar with Aesop’s fable: during good times, the 
ant saves while the grasshopper parties. When winter comes, the ant prospers 
and the grasshopper starves. Aesop’s treatment does not discuss what hap-
pens to gadflies. 
 93. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1196 (2003) (“[T]he more complex the 
decision, the less attractive it will be to force people to choose for themselves, 
as opposed to having the option of . . . receiving a default option that has been 
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3. The Second Order Case for EB Interventions 
a. Modifying the Baseline: Regulatory Alternatives 
Concluding that a certain regulatory intervention is pref-
erable to doing nothing—although analytically valuable be-
cause it distinguishes salutary actions from harmless or worth-
less ones—does not tell the whole story. Regulatory options are 
not binary; one can do more than “nothing” or “use an EB in-
tervention.”95 
A common and fruitful way to categorize regulatory alter-
natives is to divide them into “market” or “government” alter-
natives. Along these lines, four options present themselves.96 
Option one is the baseline option: an unregulated market. Op-
tion two is the EB option: regulating the inclusion of Good X in 
the labor deal. Option three is regulation of the non-EB market, 
the best example of which is directly regulating the providers of 
Good X. Option four is government provision of Good X (of 
which there are both budget-neutral and non-budget neutral 
varieties).97 
 
selected with some care.”). Thinking along these lines motivated the passage 
of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 of the United States Code). 
See A Nudge and a Wink: How To Persuade Employees To Provide for Their 
Old Age, ECONOMIST (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18433194 
(observing that the PPA, which permits employers to automatically enroll em-
ployees in 401(k) plans so long as the employee is allowed to opt out, combats 
the problem of hyperbolic discounting). 
 94. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduci-
ary Obligation in Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11–12, 15 
(2013) (describing and providing an example of how changes to default set-
tings can drastically alter decisions). 
 95. There are innumerable regulatory alternatives to doing nothing: tech-
nically, one option for fixing a market problem with Good X is for the govern-
ment to summarily threaten to imprison the family members of the providers 
of Good X unless they offer Good X to anyone who asks at some specified price. 
Any EB intervention would be better than that, but it is not particularly note-
worthy to point that out. 
 96. One can, of course, combine these options. In the United States, re-
tirement income is addressed through an employment-based intervention 
(ERISA), regulation of individuals (IRAs), and through government provision 
(Social Security). And motivations for adopting different interventions might 
be non-economic: if a certain group is disadvantaged, the way to remediate 
that group might be by government provision of Good X, even though the gov-
ernment prefers a market approach to all other parties. But the utility of the 
classification still stands. 
 97. A budget-neutral approach is one in which the government simulates 
a market provider of a good (in that it does not want its costs to forever exceed 
its revenues) but (1) does not need to earn a profit and (2) is willing to tolerate 
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The appeal of an EB intervention depends not only on its 
ability to improve things relative to option one, but also its abil-
ity to improve things relative to options three and four. The 
magnitude of an EB intervention’s comparative appeal depends 
on a variety of factors, consideration and valuation of which are 
not amenable to an article-length treatment. However, a useful 
theoretical framework for EB interventions would be incom-
plete if it did not address what we might call their intuitive 
comparative advantages. By intuitive comparative advantages, 
I mean identifiable but non-strict formulations of an EB inter-
vention’s comparative appeal (relative to options three and 
four) that may populate the consciousness of policymakers and 
reformers. 
b. Regulatory Amenability 
The first second-order rationale justifying EB interventions 
can be concisely stated: the employment relationship is a con-
venient nexus for regulatory intervention, and employers are 
convenient subjects. 
For regulatory interventions to be effective they must at-
tach to some set of acts and impose compliance obligation on 
some party or parties.98 For example, if the government wants 
to intervene directly in the market by transferring money to 
members of specified groups, it still needs a channel or contact 
point by which it can transfer resources to the desired recipi-
ents. One common way to do this is by running the intervention 
 
volatility in revenues and liabilities that no private provider could handle. 
Non-budget-neutral varieties of government provision condition eligibility on 
need (or something similar, like membership in a protected class) rather than 
willingness to pay and thus lack pretensions of budget neutrality. A govern-
ment program could combine both approaches, attempting to be somewhat 
budget neutral with respect to persons who can afford Good X, and willing to 
subsidize people who cannot. Federal education loans with Pay-As-You-Earn 
payback are (in principle) a combination approach. See FACTSHEET: Making 
Student Loans More Affordable, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 9, 2014), https:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/factsheet-making-student 
-loans-more-affordable. 
 98. A government rule that all Americans need to eat healthy meals, for 
example, has no effective regulatory nexus. A government rule that regulates 
what restaurants may serve or what grocery stores may sell, on the other 
hand, does have an effective regulatory nexus: restaurant and grocery store 
purchases. Certainly one can imagine the first rule being coupled with the 
creation of a regulatory nexus, as in, all Americans must eat healthy and re-
port monthly to the government their food consumption. In essence, however, 
the government has created millions of new acts (reporting) as the attachment 
point for its power. 
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through the tax system; another common way is to create an 
agency to serve as an administrative contact point between the 
government and market participants. Compliance responsibil-
ity, i.e., showing eligibility for the money, rests largely with the 
individual, although the government may attempt to simplify 
compliance obligations to ensure the target populations partici-
pate.  
EB interventions use the labor bargain as the nexus of 
regulation and employers as the nexus of compliance. The intu-
itive appeal is at least two-fold. First, employers and employees 
strike labor bargains every day, millions of times over, and they 
do so for reasons that conceptually antecede the presence of an 
EB intervention: employers need workers and workers need 
wages. The labor bargain is a robust regulatory target because 
people are not easily able to abandon labor bargains, and thus 
the chance that a significant segment of the population will un-
dermine the government’s efforts to intervene by not engaging 
in the bargain is small. Other bargains (or mere acts), in con-
trast, if burdened with interventionist regulation, might be 
more readily abandoned. 
Second, EB interventions may require less affirmative 
work from the government than more direct interventions be-
cause EB interventions conscript employers as quasi-
administrators and assume employers can handle more compli-
cated compliance obligations than, say, individuals. Indeed, 
employers have been conscripted as private bureaucrats on tax 
matters (and others) for years.99 EB interventions simply ex-
pand on an existing regulatory relationship between the gov-
ernment and employers. 
Obviously, the persuasiveness of this justification depends 
on the specifics of a given EB intervention and what alternative 
to which one is comparing it. But the foregoing represents a 
 
 99. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regu-
lating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 677 (2006) (concluding that the tax-
collecting structure of the United States, which heavily involves employers, 
has been an “unqualified success” in terms of compliance); Richard L. 
Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 595 (1982) 
(observing that “government in effect deputizes segments of the private sector 
to” collect and verify taxes). Scholars have extensively criticized use of em-
ployers in this way, a subject I revisit in Part II.C. A more recent example of a 
bureaucratic compliance duty tacked onto employers has been on the question 
of immigration status. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and “Aliens”: Privacy 
Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1095–96 
(2008) (explaining employer reporting and verification obligations regarding 
employee work eligibility). 
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natural if rebuttable assumption about the appeal of EB inter-
ventions within the universe of regulatory solutions. They do 
not build from scratch; they drape a regulatory lattice over an 
existing network of robust bargains and familiar parties. 
c. What-It-Is-Not Appeal and “Invisible Fingers” 
The second set of second-order justifications is more nebu-
lous than regulatory amenability and consists of residual res-
ervations about regulatory interventions. Some meaningful 
percentage of the American populace and decision-making 
community has a preference for market resolutions.100 EB in-
terventions speak to that preference, and accordingly begin 
with a stronger intuitive “lead” in reform debates than is wide-
ly acknowledged. This is both because of what they are and 
what they are not. 
The brief in favor of markets for those who support reli-
ance on them is well known.101 Market resolutions are allegedly 
desirable because they are efficient; because they accommodate 
heterogeneous preference and involve choice, a good unto itself; 
and because they encourage planning and care. Pure private 
markets, however, rarely suffice in producing the desired dis-
tribution of goods American stakeholders prefer. At the other 
pole, government provision of goods and/or pricing by central 
fiat has always been hostile to the United States’ conception of 
itself. Some middle ground between pure government and pure 
market is imagined and professed to be the ideal, although 
there is no agreement on the details.102  
EB interventions occupy a pleasing (to some) compromise 
between market and government. All EB interventions regulate 
the labor bargain with respect to some Good X. Although not 
logically necessary, as a practical matter many EB interven-
tions will offer some “market” discretion to the employer or em-
 
 100. Obviously EB interventions will also please opportunists who believe 
such interventions will, in practice, be easy to exploit for personal or political 
gain. I consider that quite a different category than persons who, motivated by 
a sincere desire to improve the nation’s welfare, have chosen to favor market 
resolutions absent fairly clear evidence that they lead to undesirable results. I 
leave consideration of that first category to political scientists.  
 101. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM & FREEDOM (1962) (lay-
ing out an expansive case for the desirability of markets). 
 102. Compared to European countries, there is no serious economic left in 
the United States. It might be only a slight overstatement to say that main-
stream Americans presume markets work and differ primarily in how rebut-
table that presumption is. I mean this descriptively, without implying praise 
or criticism.  
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ployee as to the terms of Good X. That discretionary component 
permits some element of Good X to be subject to market treat-
ment (and, one would hope, the part of Good X that did not 
need regulatory intervention). Put differently, EB interventions 
can be readily incremental: with respect to those dimensions of 
Good X that do not suffer from market infirmity, the market 
can resolve matters itself. Not an invisible hand, but at least 
some invisible fingers. 
The invisible fingers appeal of EB interventions will charm 
stakeholders persuaded the market is imperfect but worried 
about excessive government intrusion. It is a seductive com-
promise position for those open to the idea of government regu-
lation but as yet unpersuaded either that (1) the market failure 
regarding Good X is as bad as critics assert or that (2) pro-
posals for more extensive government regulation are workable 
in practice. Because assuring oneself of either the former or the 
latter requires effort and possibly expertise, EB interventions 
serve as a nice default solution for stakeholders inclined to ac-
cept the general “centrist” proposition that “some but not too 
much” intervention is necessary. 
Obviously this set of rationales will not advantage EB in-
terventions over other “middle ground” solutions. And its im-
portance, in practical terms, will wax and wane with the Amer-
ican polity’s taste for both markets and compromise. 
C. CRITICIZING EB INTERVENTIONS 
Having set forth the reasons that might be offered in favor 
of EB interventions, in this Part II.C. I articulate and catego-
rize arguments against their use. As I emphasized in Part II.A., 
the operative feature of an EB intervention is government con-
scription of the labor deal to remedy a market failure as to the 
quantity, distribution, or quality of Good X. Using the labor 
deal in such a way, however, poses inherent challenges that, 
taken together, comprise a systematic criticism of EB ap-
proaches. Before articulating the case against EB interven-
tions, I set the stage by explaining the relevant points of refer-
ence, as well as offering an explanation of how EB bargains 
should be understood. 
 1. Blended Baselines 
Setting forth a comprehensive account of the limits and 
disadvantages of EB interventions requires periodic shifting of 
the point of comparison. The inappropriateness of EB interven-
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tions for many goods is easy to see: they are not needed because 
the market for the good is satisfactory or because the problems 
are not problems readily remediable by an EB approach. Those 
are the easy cases, where use of an EB intervention would be 
useless or harmful.  
For the hard cases—for the set of goods whose problems 
are such that an EB solution seems like it could work—rarely 
will any seriously considered EB intervention make matters 
worse than the baseline world. Practically useful EB criticism 
is instead best conceived of as suggesting two things. The first 
is that while an EB intervention might be superior to the base-
line world, it is less so than it seems at first glance. The second 
is that while an EB intervention might be substantially better 
than the baseline world, when compared to other regulatory 
approaches it has significant (if not immediately apparent) 
negatives. The below analysis blends both arguments together. 
2. Understanding EB Bargains for X 
Virtually all economists agree that, when Good X is called 
an employee benefit, it is paid for with foregone employee wag-
es.103 Given that, we can readily think of two ways an employer 
might deliver X to its employees. Way one is that the employer 
actually provides the good itself. In the case of disability insur-
ance, an example would be an employer promising to and then 
paying out disability benefits itself. Way two is for the employ-
er to finance Good X by paying (using foregone employer wages) 
a third party to provide Good X, e.g., a disability insurance pol-
icy, to its employees. In either case the employer is acting as an 
administrative financing channel by passing along foregone 
employee wages; but in the former case it is compensating itself 
 
 103. See Sherwin Rosen, The Theory of Equalizing Differences, in HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 641 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 
1986) (explaining wage differential theory); see also Elizabeth Sepper, Contra-
ception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 303, 321 n.86–89 (2014) (surveying empirical studies on the subject).  
If the employer benefits from providing Good X, then some of the cost of 
Good X should come from the employer’s pocket rather than employee wages. 
But that benefit is generally so small that we can think of benefits as being 
paid for essentially entirely by foregone wages. It is also unlikely, incidentally, 
that the employees will be able to assess the value to the employer of provid-
ing Good X to its employees, and negotiate effectively to ensure their wage re-
duction corresponds only to the net loss to the employer. Cf. David Charny, 
The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 n.16 
(1996) (describing the complexity of the problem). 
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to provide Good X, and in the latter case it is compensating a 
third party to do so. 
Keeping in mind the distinction between the administra-
tive-financing of Good X (which employers necessarily do in an 
EB model) and the providing of Good X (which employers may 
do), there are three possibilities available to an employer on the 
question of delivering to employees any promised Good X. Pos-
sibility one is pure employer: the employer finances and pro-
vides Good X in-house, in effect retaining the entirety of the 
Good X transaction. Possibility two is pure outsource: the em-
ployer serves as a mere administrative-financier, writing a 
check to a third party who actually provides Good X to the em-
ployees. Possibility three is an in-between approach, with the 
employer serving as an administrative-financier but also re-
taining some role in providing Good X, along with a third par-
ty.104 I will return to the challenges and difficulties with these 
approaches throughout Part II.C.3. 
3. The Case Against EB Interventions 
a. Self-Evident EB Constraints 
A few self-evident constraints on the utility of EB interven-
tions require brief mention. The first is the most obvious: EB 
interventions can only remediate Good X with respect to the 
employed and their dependents. To the extent people outside of 
that population face Good X problems, EB interventions cannot 
address them. Relatedly, non-mandatory EB interventions face 
the problem of some employers offering Good X while others do 
not. Not only does that not help workers in the latter group, it 
also likely impedes labor mobility.105 
EB approaches are also limited by the relationship be-
tween a worker’s wage and the cost of Good X. Obviously, if 
Good X costs more than a worker’s wage, an EB intervention 
cannot provide Good X without some additional subsidy 
(whether from the government or a cross-subsidy from other 
higher wage workers). If Good X would cost a significant por-
tion of a worker’s wage, then there will be a tension between 
EB approaches and minimum wage laws unless minimum wage 
 
 104. In many cases, that role will be choosing the version of Good X em-
ployees will be buying with their foregone wages. 
 105. Cf. William M. Sage, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s Rear-
View Mirror, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2014) (discussing the “job lock” as-
sociated with non-universal health care).  
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requirements take into account the value of the provided Good 
X. In an intervention where an employer has a choice to not 
participate, employers with workers whose wages cannot be re-
duced to sufficiently pay for Good X either need to (1) not hire 
such workers; (2) not offer Good X to such workers; (3) increase 
their compensation; (4) not offer Good X to any employee; or (5) 
collect a government subsidy. Although the particular choice 
employers will make depends on the circumstances, the point is 
the same: EB interventions not only do not reach non-
employees, but they are also likely to fail to reach a subset of 
the employed, and may affect overall employment.106 
Another straightforward constraint pertains to those EB 
interventions where group leverage is a central attraction. In 
those cases, the natural disaggregation of the group that would 
occur in the baseline world (and render Good X more expensive 
or unaffordable to some) is stopped via the expedient of using 
the employee group as a unit. But doing that necessarily limits 
the choice employees have in Good X (beyond choosing among 
employers who provide different versions of Good X). If employ-
ees have too much choice within the employment group—to opt 
out, or pick different features—then the group will separate in-
to subgroups that might fail to capture the advantages of group 
dealing.107 Group leverage necessarily limits choice to only 
those features that, if selected, will not destroy the integrity of 
the group.  
To the extent an EB intervention involves a good that ben-
efits little from group treatment—that is, where the bulk pur-
chasing or group corrective advantage is small, and the nega-
tive utility associated with the loss of choice is large—it will 
face natural resistance. For example, EB interventions can be 
appealing because they facilitate affordable averaging, i.e., 
subsidization of some group members by others.108 But if Good 
X is one for which most people believe they are unlikely to need 
affordable averaging, they will be less willing to pay the “pri-
 
 106. Employment effects will of course vary depending on the particulars of 
the EB scheme. For an analysis of mandated benefits, see Lawrence Summers, 
Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1989); 
cf. Joseph Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-
and-File Compensation, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 597 (1994) (discussing compensation 
and employment effects of legal requirement that benefits for highly compen-
sated employees also be provided to non-highly compensated employees).  
 107. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 108. See supra Part II.B.2 and note 83.  
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vate tax” associated with being a member of the group unit.109 
And for all goods, certain employees might be unhappy with an 
employer paternalistically making choices regarding Good X 
that—while perhaps appealing for many employees—are incon-
sistent with that employee’s own individual preference.  
b. Myopic Actors 
Compared to employees acting on their own in individual 
pursuit of Good X, EB interventions are held attractive because 
they leverage the comparative sophistication of employers. The 
critique of this argument is two-fold. First, employers are not 
particularly sophisticated regarding Good X. Second, employers 
have adverse interests to employees. They are not, in short, 
good agents, and relying on their sophistication to remediate 
problems with Good X is a poor bet, absent extensive interven-
tionist regulation. Systemic agency cost both reduces the de-
gree to which an EB intervention can improve Good X and sig-
nificantly increases the amount of regulation necessary to 
accomplish that improvement.  
i. Questioning Sophistication  
The inconvenient fact about employers is that the task of 
delivering an optimal Good X is quite far removed from the em-
ployer’s “core competency,”110 which is to produce and market 
whatever good or service the employer’s business sells.111 Gen-
erally Good X—annuities, insurance, etc.—is a distinct busi-
ness specialty all its own. Indeed, if the selling of Good X were 
a fairly simple business, it is unlikely for there to be a market 
failure that justifies use of an EB intervention in the first 
place. 
In Part II.C.2 above, I sketched three possible ways for an 
employer to deliver Good X: internally, via outsourcing, or by 
 
 109. Solidarity, as well as confusion about the existence or extent of the 
subsidy, are countervailing forces. See Moore, supra note 12, at 40–41 (dis-
cussing solidarity). 
 110. See, e.g., Russ Banham, The Great Pension Derisking, 29 CFO MAG. 
40, 40 (2013), http://ww2.cfo.com/retirement-plans/2013/04/the-great-pension 
-derisking/view-all (quoting the vice president of finance at General Motors as 
explaining that making cars, not offering pensions, is the company’s core com-
petency). 
 111. Striking a wage deal is fairly simple because it is short term and has 
few operative terms; it is also a necessary predicate for having a business in 
the first instance. Striking a Good X deal is not necessary in the first instance, 
and is much more complicated, because the underlying transactions and terms 
of the deal are more complicated. 
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some combination of the two. Because most employers’ core 
competencies do not extend to Good X transactions, internal 
provision is of limited appeal. It involves a non-expert attempt-
ing to perform an expert function. It is unlikely that a trucking 
company, for example, can create a better pension arrangement 
than a third party firm that specializes in retirement annui-
ties.112 Few employers will completely internalize the delivery of 
Good X. But some will. 
Of the group that does, some will internalize Good X with-
out realizing they will be poor providers of Good X. For exam-
ple, an employer might make a pension promise but have insuf-
ficient skill in saving and managing the money necessary to 
make good on the promise. To prevent employers from trying to 
poorly provide Good X on their own, the government will need 
to (1) bar them from doing so or (2) heavily regulate employer 
provision of Good X.113 
Other employers will realize they lack the capability to 
completely internalize the provision of Good X, and therefore 
engage third parties (either in part or for the whole deal) to 
handle or advise them on the particulars of Good X that the 
employer lacks sufficient expertise in. In both cases, significant 
regulation will be needed. The immediate risk is the possibility 
that expert third parties will take advantage of the employer 
with respect to the provision of Good X. The third party is an 
expert; the employer is not. EB interventions are motivated in 
part by the concern that individual employees, on their own in 
the open market, will strike poor deals (or no deals) for Good X. 
A more subtle species of precisely that concern arises when 
non-expert employers seek to outsource the provision of Good X 
to expert third party providers. To prevent the third parties 
 
 112. Now, admittedly, some employers are likely capable of developing suf-
ficient expertise in Good X to handle it completely in-house. Those players still 
need to be regulated during their learning phase. Once they are experts they 
can easily take advantage of employees and will need to be regulated. What is 
gained in that instance—as opposed to directly regulating Good X providers, 
and never asking employers to develop new expertise in the first place—is not 
clear. 
 113. There are different ways such regulation could occur. One is a regula-
tion such that the expertise needed to comply with a limiting regulation is 
modest. If the government, for example, specifies that employers providing 
pensions need to set aside three percent of an employee’s wages in trust ac-
counts and invest the proceeds in treasury bills, then many employers could 
reliably perform that function. I am not suggesting that is a good idea,merely 
that it is easy to do. 
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from exploiting employers, the government will need to regu-
late the terms of deals with third party provision of Good X.114 
ii. Questioning Adversarial Paternalism 
Above I questioned the relevant sophistication of employ-
ers. In this Part, I assume as a given that some employers are 
meaningfully more sophisticated than employees on matters 
pertinent to Good X. As I explain below, we should be skeptical 
that employers’ comparative sophistication will, without con-
siderable regulatory intervention, be used to benefit employees 
in a way that tends to optimize Good X. The assumption other-
wise depends on some version of “adversarial paternalism”—
where an economic adversary places his opponent’s interest 
above his own.115 Such is extremely unlikely. 
Complex goods. Some goods, and the transactions to ac-
quire them, are more complicated than others. Buying a pencil 
is simpler than buying a house. The Goods X of EB interven-
tions will tend to be goods that are complicated in their particu-
lars. We might say generally that the more complicated Good X 
is, the larger the number of material characteristics it will 
have. In an EB intervention, the government will either regu-
late all these characteristics or will regulate some. The remain-
der will be left to negotiation between employee and employers. 
As to those negotiable characteristics, the difficulty is that 
when the terms of the Good X bargain are being negotiated, the 
employer is presumptively the employee’s adversary. The so-
phistication held to justify an EB intervention may, if actually 
present, be deployed to stick employees with unfavorable terms 
on matters employers but not employees understand. If on their 
own workers might make poor choices because they do not 
know better, that same weakness can be exploited in labor ne-
gotiations.116 If there is room to negotiate, then employers will 
 
 114. And this is assuming the employer is acting as an honest agent. There 
will be innumerable opportunities for the employer to strike deals with a third 
party that benefit the employer and the third party at the cost of the employ-
ee. I consider that possibility in more detail below. 
 115. Indeed, market behavior may be driven by an employer’s non-
economic preferences regarding Good X. Precisely such a preference resulted 
in the Hobby Lobby dispute. See infra notes 13337 and accompanying text.  
 116. One regulatory approach—to align management and labor by forcing 
management to be subject to whatever terms govern workers’ benefits—has 
proven astonishingly difficult to operationalize. ERISA and the tax code’s at-
tempt to partially accomplish this, through a set of rules known as “nondis-
crimination requirements,” has resulted “in a notoriously technical regulatory 
scheme” understood poorly even by experts. COLLEEN MEDILL, INTRODUCTION 
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dominate in nonunion settings. To the extent employers are 
negotiating with a third party provider of Good X (allegedly on 
the employees’ behalf), employer indifference to third party op-
portunism, if not outright collusion, is a significant risk.117 
Labor scholars have long recognized the imbalance in pow-
er between management and workers in real world markets.118 
That general proposition is even more true when the negotiated 
subject is something as non-intuitive as the set of material 
characteristics for complex Goods X, such as annuities, retire-
ment accounts, or insurance. 
Let me pause here to consider one frequent response to the 
problem of exploitation of employees by employers—that 
nonlegal forces will operate to limit exploitation. Traditional 
versions of this class of arguments are (1) that exploitation will 
eventually be discovered by labor and punished; (2) that exploi-
tation will actually hurt management because it will make 
their workforce less productive; or (3) that management will 
not exploit labor because it is morally offensive.119 Certainly 
 
TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 163 (4th ed. 2015).  
 117. Cf. Ian Ayres & Curtis Quinn, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive 
Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE 
L.J. 1476 (2015) (detailing the frequency of poor-performing, high-cost funds 
in 401(k) plans); Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs 
of Employment-Based Health Insurance: Of Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory 
Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037 (1996) (examining in detail the rea-
sons why employers may be poor agents when it comes to selecting health in-
surance for employees); Jessica L. Roberts, An Alternate Theory of Hobby Lob-
by v. Burwell, 22 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (spelling out numerous 
strategies practiced by employers to minimize the provision of promised care); 
Gretchen Morgenson, A Lone Ranger of the 401(k)’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2014, at B1 (detailing a series of lawsuits against retirement plans relating to 
excessive fees charged by asset managers managing EB retirement monies). 
 118. Adam Smith himself wrote that management held the upper hand 
over labor. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 74 (Edward Cannan ed., 
1904) (1776) (“It is not, however, difficult to foresee [that management] must, 
upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute [with labor], 
and force the other into a compliance with their terms.”); see also LLOYD G. 
REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 76–77 (8th ed. 1982) 
(explaining reasons why in imperfect markets individual laborers will be at a 
bargaining disadvantage); Richard T. Ely, Economic Theory and Labor Legis-
lation, 9 AM. ECON. ASSOC. Q. 124, 139–46 (1908) (arguing that freedom of 
contract alone cannot and will not protect laborers); Douglas L. Leslie, Labor 
Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 360–64 (1984) (describing role of unions 
in levelling bargaining power in imperfect markets); Roscoe Pound, Liberty of 
Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 487 (1909) (describing unequal bargaining condi-
tions between industry and labor). 
 119. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared 
with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1063–68 
(1984) (discussing some examples of possible market limits on power of firms 
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those arguments, in any context, depend on complicated ques-
tions of first principles and empirical evidence. But there is 
good reason to doubt, with respect to EB goods, that nonlegal 
forces will satisfactorily curb employer exploitation, let alone 
promote paternalism; more likely, it seems, significant govern-
ment intervention will be necessary. 
Limited market constraint on exploitation. In the EB con-
text employee ability to police exploitation is minimal. Policing 
exploitation requires (1) awareness that it will or has occurred 
and (2) the leverage to act on that awareness. 
EB interventions are justified in part on the comparative 
lack of sophistication of employees relative to employers. If that 
is true, then employees are unlikely to appreciate ex ante (dur-
ing the negotiation of deal terms) the many ways in which a 
superficially appealing promise of Good X could be undermined 
ex post; if they can, this imputes to employees more ability 
than they were probably assumed to have in justifying the EB 
intervention in the first instance.120 Even ex post, when some 
employees may have learned the deal for Good X contained 
some unpleasant provisions, employees lack a mechanism to 
take corrective action. Most employees are not unionized, and 
thus do not share or possess the ability to act on information 
that would improve their lot.121 Moreover, the standard channel 
for employee leverage—leaving for another job because one is 
displeased with the terms of the bargain with the original em-
ployer—is more limited than usual with respect to Goods X, for 
several reasons. 
First, the labor bargain does not organically specify what 
part of the compensation deal is for wages and what part is for 
Good X (or Good X and Good Y, if the labor bargain includes, as 
it often does, more than one benefit). Absent some simple in-
formation on the amount of his compensation that goes to Good 
X or Good Y, the employee has little hope of comparatively val-
uing the Good X terms he is getting from Employer A against 
the Good X terms he could get from Employer B. 
Second, even if all employers were to provide (or be re-
quired to provide) a simple breakdown of how compensation 
 
to exploit labor). 
 120. There are other reasons to justify EB interventions beyond lack of em-
ployee sophistication and positional disadvantage, of course. See supra Part 
II.B. But the force of this point should still be clear. 
 121. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union 
Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008) (discussing decline of unions).  
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was divided into wages and Good X benefits, the actual terms of 
Good X benefits are difficult to obtain, understand, and com-
pare. Consider an insurance and retirement example. 
To value an insurance policy, one needs more than the 
price; one needs to understand the scope of coverage, which is 
set forth in the terms of the policy. It is difficult to imagine how 
a prospective employee could, as a candidate, secure for review 
the terms of the health insurance offered to employees, without 
the new employer being concerned that the employee is seeking 
to change jobs for “the wrong reasons” (or otherwise presents a 
hidden characteristic that makes hiring the employee undesir-
able).122 
Consider also the recent comments of AOL CEO Tim Arm-
strong. Armstrong complained that AOL’s benefit costs were 
too high, and cited the example of two workers whose infants 
required expensive care.123 Even though Armstrong later apolo-
gized,124 one imagines prospective employees could easily worry 
that to ask for sufficient details about AOL’s health coverage 
(so as to assess the comparative worth of it) might implicitly 
but negatively impact their chances of being hired. More gener-
ally, demanding as a part of the hiring process to see the under-
lying documents regarding health insurance is unlikely to cut 
in favor of the job candidate. Many will choose not to do so. 
Similar concerns arise when Good X is a retirement ar-
rangement. Retirement arrangement terms are generally so 
complicated that the current law requires the employer to sup-
ply employees with a summary document, written in plain Eng-
lish, that permits the employee to understand the basic con-
tours of the arrangement.125 That an employee would, in a 
 
 122. This is one reason scholars have proposed as to why employees do not 
seek more “just cause” termination provisions—because seeking that protec-
tion suggests to the employer the existence of an undesirable quality in the 
candidate employee. See David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in 
the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 294, 294–305 (1991). 
As recent scholarship has demonstrated, insurance terms are not easy to ob-
tain in general, and the will-I-be-hired overlay will make doing so doubly diffi-
cult. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1319–37 (2011) (reporting significant difficulty ob-
taining, in casualty insurance markets, actual insurance policies before pur-
chase). 
 123. See Leslie Kaufman, Facing Criticism After Remarks, AOL Chief Re-
verses 401(k) Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2014, at B3. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2012) (requiring the furnishing of a “summary plan 
description” explaining benefit terms in a way comprehensible to “the average 
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natural market, be readily capable of securing documentation 
on the numerous terms of the retirement arrangement at the 
new company is an unrealistic assumption. 
Even if we assume that candidate employees could obtain 
the documentation that would allow an expert to value Good X, 
employees are not experts. On the question of health insurance, 
for example, valuing the promised coverage is an exceedingly 
complicated endeavor, one that depends on likelihoods (of suf-
fering from a particular malady) and costs (of paying for treat-
ment of that particular malady) that employees simply do not 
have access to or an ability to reliably evaluate.126 As many 
scholars have explained, expecting nonexperts to optimally 
value contracts with multiple variables is unrealistic.127 Most 
people will engage in shortcut strategies that are suboptimal.128 
Such errors will be compounded when the employee is not only 
attempting to value Good X from the prospective employer, but 
compare it to the Good X offered by the original employer. 
Even assuming employees can obtain, value, and compare 
the terms of Good X across job opportunities, their ability to use 
that information to police employers is minimal.129 Their most 
powerful tool—taking a job elsewhere—is profoundly limited in 
weak labor markets. Even in strong labor markets, switching 
jobs is a monumental event; one cannot easily move to a new 
position as easily as one could, say, choose a new movie theater 
to the extent the old theater was too air-conditioned for one’s 
liking. Employees are similar to consumers in that they may 
lack sophistication regarding the deal to be struck, but employ-
ees (particularly unskilled employees) have even less exit pow-
er. And in the EB context, employees will often be suffering 
under an additional burden. Many Goods X are most valuable 
(and their terms most salient) to people who are in a weakened 
position, such as: they are near-elderly; they are sick or have a 
 
plan participant”). 
 126. See Maher & Stris, supra note 32, at 462 (explaining difficulty con-
sumers will have in valuing health insurance). 
 127. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 70, at 1082; see also Robert A. 
Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1713 (2003) (explaining that “[b]ehavioral con-
siderations, rather than efficient bargaining, explain why consumers” accept 
one-sided contracts). 
 128. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 70, at 1082. 
 129. Cf. Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor Law and Employment Regulation: Insti-
tutional and Neoclassical Perspectives, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 3, 30–34 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2009) (discussing 
limited ability of workers to negotiate compensation or conditions). 
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sick family member; or they are disabled. Those candidates, 
however the law may protect them, will in real terms face lim-
ited lateral opportunities. 
I need be careful not to overstate the case. Certainly labor 
markets provide enough competitive pressure such that broad 
features of the employment condition—wages, hours, the exist-
ence of a pension or health insurance—can play an actual real 
world role in employee decisions. But one doubts that the more 
narrow and obscure terms of Good X will, even if grossly pro-
employer (or pro-third-party-provider), burden employers with 
a competitive loss, certainly in the short term. Put more formal-
ly, one doubts the degree to which the operative terms of Good 
X will (1) be variables employees are cognizant of; (2) be varia-
bles employees can value; or (3) be the dominant variables, in 
the job-taking decision. That reality weakens the constraint a 
natural market might impose on employer-employee exploita-
tion.130 
Limited self-interested constraint on exploitation. A second 
commonly invoked non-legal constraint is the notion that ex-
ploitation will only hurt employers, because for a given group of 
employees, those without Good X will underperform.131 There is, 
of course, some truth to this observation; after all, most EB in-
terventions follow employers organically—i.e., with no govern-
ment incentive—offering Good X as a part of the labor deal.132 
The chief problem with this point is that the set of terms 
that makes Good X ideal in quantity, distribution, and quality 
for society will virtually never correspond to the set of terms 
that makes Good X ideal for a given business. So, for example, 
in some businesses health insurance is extremely valuable; in 
others less so. In some businesses health insurance for particu-
lar maladies is extremely valuable, in others, less so. If the 
check on exploitation is that employers will not wish to exploit 
employees via the terms Good X because Good X is needed to 
maximize performance, employers will only be inclined to offer 
 
 130. Cf. Daniel J. Chepaitis, The National Labor Relations Act, Non-
Paralleled Competition, and Market Power, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 769, 782 (1997) 
(arguing that the fact “that some workers will exit tells us nothing about 
whether labor markets are competitive”).  
 131. Cf. Paul B. Ginsburg, Employment-Based Health Benefits Under Uni-
versal Coverage, 27 HEALTH AFF. 675, 677 (2008) (suggesting that employees 
with health insurance will have superior performance). The empirical data on 
this assertion is mixed. See Moore, supra note 28, at 898–99 (surveying the 
empirical literature). 
 132. See supra Part I. 
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a Good X tailored to their needs, rather than an ideal Good X. 
And employers collectively seem likely to negotiate Good X in 
the direction of sub-optimality, because they are unlikely to in-
ternalize the same broad set of concerns that drives society’s 
conception of an optimal Good X. 
The recent Hobby Lobby dispute is illustrative of the unex-
pected ways that employer preference can frustrate the provi-
sion of a socially optimal Good X.133 Much has been written 
about the case but here the basics of the dispute should suf-
fice.134 The ACA requires that certain health insurance policies 
include coverage for contraception.135 The petitioner companies 
provided health insurance to their employees that was subject 
to this requirement. Those companies’ owners, as devout Chris-
tians who opposed contraception, contended the ACA contra-
ception coverage requirement (and the corresponding penalty 
for failing to comply) violated their religious freedom.136  
In EB theory terms, Hobby Lobby involved a clash between 
an employer’s view of what Good X should be and society’s view 
(as expressed in legislation) of what Good X should be. While 
normally an employer’s view is trumped by legislative man-
date, in Hobby Lobby the plaintiffs invoked religious freedom to 
protect the employer’s view, and called upon the Supreme 
Court to resolve the conflict between religious freedom and the 
ACA.137 But that should not obscure the larger takeaway, which 
is that when employers have either legal or market freedom to 
define Good X, they are likely to do so, and employer-specific 
definitions of Good X may often diverge from what society be-
lieves is the ideal version of Good X.  
Limited moral constraint on exploitation. The third point—
that business owners and managers are moral beings who find 
the suffering of employees distasteful and are therefore disin-
clined to exploit advantages they have in deal-making over 
 
 133. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 134. See infra Part II.C.3.d for a different way in which the Hobby Lobby 
dispute is consonant with EB theory.  
 135. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). See generally Marty Lederman, 
Compendium of Posts on Hobby Lobby and Related Cases, BALKINIZATION (Ju-
ly 19, 2014, 3:16 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/02/compendium-of-posts 
-on-hobby-lobby-and.html. As a scholar intimately familiar with the mind-
numbing details of various benefits statutes, I must say that Professor Leder-
man’s ACA posts are a thing of beauty. 
 136. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
 137. The Court ruled in favor of the companies and their owners. Id. 
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Good X—is one commonly invoked by industry advocates.138 Of 
course, employee advocates may believe such expressions of 
concern for worker well-being are little more than insincere 
public relations efforts. And casual observation suggests that 
some employers do indeed subscribe to the notion that profit 
maximization, absent illegality, is the only moral of the market. 
While for some that may be true, however, for many others it is 
probably not: employers often do feel some form of moral obliga-
tion to their workers. The challenge is that that moral feeling 
needs to be matched by moral action. In a commercial environ-
ment, there are significant pressures on businesses to make 
profit-maximizing decisions that are at odds with vague moral 
intuitions and concomitant assurances that they will treat 
workers “right.” 
Sometimes the argument is made that the market values 
morality and fair play, and that actors who behave that way 
will reap financial rewards.139 If the market always rewards a 
gentle moral solicitude for workers, then profit maximization 
and compassion will not diverge. But the reality is that virtual-
ly no one accepts this to be the case; in some set of cases, the 
correct “business” decision will be to do something different 
than that which is the least exploitative or most compassionate 
toward employees. This is not to impugn business decisions as 
immoral—not at all—but merely to make the uncontroversial 
point that humanistic warmth toward others is routinely, in 
commercial settings, deprioritized or set aside. If that is true, 
the morals of the marketplace will serve as an insufficient 
check against exploitation of employees. 
c. Regulatory Fragility 
One of the rationales for EB interventions—that the labor 
bargain, and in particular employers, are attractive regulatory 
 
 138. Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there 
was a movement by certain industrialists to promote benefits “for the comfort 
or improvement of employees [that were] neither a necessity of the industry 
nor required by law.” See BRANDES, supra note 63, at 5–6. A key motivation in 
this movement was the perceived moral obligation of an employer to improve 
the lives of its workers. All manner of benefits were provided, including health 
care, dietary counseling, child care, schools, lodging, recreational facilities, 
and pensions. Id. at 5–110.  
 139. Cf. Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 801, 
837–38 (2012) (discussing the market and social appeal of fair play and good 
faith in relations between companies, employees, consumers, and competitors).  
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targets—has a flip side. EB interventions are regulatorily frag-
ile and invite opportunism. 
Regulatory flight occurs when the regulated party aban-
dons the thing being regulated or replaces it with a substitute 
that is subject to less regulation. Because Goods X are often 
complicated, government efforts to regulate some version of 
Good X will create immediate pressure on employers to offer a 
version of Good X that is less regulated. Given the limitations 
on employee power to check employer movement from a heavily 
regulated Good X to a less regulated substitute, one need al-
ways be mindful of the unintended consequences of strict regu-
lation. And even if one believes that existing or proposed regu-
lation appropriately regulates all substitutes, employers still 
retain the power in voluntary EB interventions to simply not 
offer Good X. 
This first order effect is relatively uncontroversial. Many 
believe, for example, that such regulatory flight explains in 
part the transition from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans that has occurred in the United States since ERISA was 
enacted.140 Defined benefit plans are subject to extremely re-
strictive regulations, with little employer discretion on im-
portant terms such as funding and vesting, and much liability 
regarding investment of the plan’s assets. Defined contribution 
plans, on the other hand, are subject to significantly less regu-
lation, particularly the variety of defined contribution plan that 
permits participants to make their own investment decisions.141 
All other things being equal, many employers will prefer the 
greater flexibility associated with the latter. Whether the bet-
ter form of retirement income is to draw on a pension or from a 
participant-managed investment account has been intensely 
debated by scholars.142 If the fact is, as many scholars believe, 
that pensions are more desirable, then ERISA’s intense regula-
tion of pensions and comparatively light regulations of retire-
ment accounts provided a powerful regulatory incentive for 
employers to make the wrong choice. 
 
 140. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security 
Reform: Lessons from Private Pensions, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 308 (2007) 
(offering reasons for the rise of defined contribution plans and the decline of 
defined benefit plans). 
 141. See supra Part I.B; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012) (limiting fiduci-
ary liability in the case of participant-directed plans).  
 142. See generally ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP 
SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS (2004). 
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A second consequence is more hidden. Economic fortunes 
wax and wane. In prosperity employers may be more willing to 
engage in activities outside of their core competencies. In 
gloomier times, employers will be inclined to streamline their 
operations, and retreat to those things they do best, of which 
providing Good X is unlikely to be one. We can expect, then, 
that tough times will lead to maximum resistance from em-
ployers to continue providing Good X, or to comply with regula-
tions necessary to ensure that the Good X provided resembles 
Good X of sufficient quality that motivated the regulatory in-
tervention in the first place. Those times are precisely when 
people are most needy of robust versions of Good X. 
While regulatory opportunism—whether in lean times or 
not—might be expected from all private providers of Good X 
(whether by employers or third party specialists), it has a dif-
ferent valence coming from employers. Employers, as incidental 
providers of Good X, face a different calculus than does a third 
party provider who specializes in Good X. Both will dislike 
rules constraining what they can do, but the former has a more 
credible threat that it will wash its hands of the whole Good X 
business. Given that an EB intervention is justified in the first 
instance by some problem with Good X in the baseline world, 
this threat will virtually always have enhanced currency; no 
one is eager to return to the baseline. When attempting to 
promulgate or construe the meaning of a given EB interven-
tion’s rules regarding employer freedom on Good X, regulators 
will be, whether willingly or not, dragged into balancing the 
threats of employers to abandon Good X against the unpleas-
antness of the baseline world.143 And they will be strongly pres-
sured to be solicitous of employers. 
d. Opacity 
A final flaw with EB interventions is their tendency to ob-
fuscate the relevant problem and the comparative value of al-
ternative solutions. Above I considered how EB arrangements 
might make it difficult for employees to compare job opportuni-
ties. Something similar happens on a societal scale. 
 
 143. Engaging in such balancing seems a difficult task in particular for 
judges, absent careful instruction from the legislature and administrative 
agencies. It invites judges to play a role that, without carefully considered 
guidance, they may be unable to effectively perform. And few judges, whatever 
their professed theory of statutory interpretation, interpret the language of 
any statute in a vacuum. Reality affects adjudication. 
  
1306 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1257 
 
EB interventions regulate (and generally promote) the in-
clusion of social goods in labor deal as nonwage compensation. 
Absent regulation requiring the value of Good X to be specified, 
there is likely to be confusion about what Good X costs, not only 
among workers, but among stakeholders at large. Consider an 
EB intervention. Now consider a regulatory world in which the 
Good X is purchased unbundled from the labor bargain. Pricing 
information in the latter case is more transparent to buyers 
and society at large, because there is a transparent market for 
Good X. 
In addition to confusion on the price of Good X, EB inter-
ventions also lead numerous stakeholders to misunderstand 
the fundamental nature of who is parting with money to obtain 
EB goods. When, in an EB setting, an employer provides Good 
X without an explicit price, people frequently assume the provi-
sion of Good X is akin to a gratuity rather than a bargain. As 
an economic matter, that is not so. Good X is a portion of com-
pensation, and “paid for” by employees via foregone wages.144 
Economists have held this view for over a century.145 Courts 
lagged behind for some time; in 1940, for example, the Harvard 
Law Review chided the New York courts for holding other-
wise.146 
In some quarters this misunderstanding lives still, alt-
hough in muted form. The much-followed Hobby Lobby case in-
volved a dispute over whether the ACA’s contraception cover-
age requirements violated the religious freedom of business 
owners opposed to contraception.147 The Supreme Court ulti-
mately ruled in favor of the business owners.148 I am not inter-
ested in evaluating the hair-splitting particulars (or wisdom) of 
the Court’s ruling.149 Of illuminative interest is the way in 
which the lawsuit was perceived.  
 
 144. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Albert de Roode, Pensions As Wages, 3 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 287 
(1913) (“A pension system . . . is really paid by the employee, not perhaps in 
money, but in the foregoing of an increase in wages which he might obtain ex-
cept for the establishment of a pension system.”); see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text (discussing wage benefit tradeoff). 
 146. Note, Legal Status of Private Industrial Pension Plans, 53 HARV. L. 
REV. 1375, 1377 (1940) (“[The gratuity] view would hardly be worthy of atten-
tion were it not for the fact that the courts of New York seem steadfastly to 
have adhered to it.”). 
 147. See 42 U.S.C § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 148. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 149. Some have suggested that the Supreme Court itself was insufficiently 
appreciative of the economic reality of who pays for benefits. See, e.g., Uwe 
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Press accounts framed the dispute as follows: does forcing 
corporations or their owners to pay for contraception violate the 
religious freedom of the corporations and their owners? As the 
Los Angeles Times put it, the issue before the Court was 
“whether a company must pay for birth control drugs that con-
flict with its owner’s religious beliefs.”150 The Times’ description 
was representative of much mainstream coverage. The problem 
with that formulation is that—for reasons having nothing to do 
with freedom of religion—it obscures the real issue. Employers 
are not paying for contraception in the sense that many ac-
counts of the dispute assumed; they are administering a plan 
that passes employee money along to an insurer who provides 
coverage that includes contraception.151 
Admittedly, the word “pay” has many different meanings. 
It can describe the administrative act of handing over money, 
even if that money does not belong to the party handing it over. 
If I have a bank account and use a bank’s “Online Bill Pay” fea-
ture, then although the money is obviously mine, we could easi-
ly describe the bank as having performed the functional act of 
paying those bills that I direct the bank to pay. But that type of 
“paying” is very different than using the word “pay” to mean 
“relinquish money that was otherwise mine to do as I pleased 
with.” Accordingly, to be compelled to serve as an administrator 
is quite different than to be compelled to relinquish money that 
 
Reinhardt, The Illogic of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/upshot/the-illogic-of 
-employer-sponsored-health-insurance.html (arguing that the Supreme Court 
failed to understand that employees, not employers, pay for benefits). Profes-
sor Reinhardt’s characterization may very well be correct, but to analyze such 
a claim here would require a lengthy and nuanced treatment of the Hobby 
Lobby opinion better suited to a separate article. 
 150. David G. Savage, The Supreme Court To Hear Cases on Obamacare 
and Birth Control, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/  
nation/la-na-court-contraceptives-20131127-story.html (“The Supreme Court 
agreed Tuesday to jump into a growing legal dispute between the Obama ad-
ministration and businesses run by conservative Christians over whether a 
company must pay for birth control drugs that conflict with its owner’s reli-
gious beliefs.”). 
 151. See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining the nature of EB bargains). With re-
gard to Hobby Lobby, many scholarly observers made precisely this point. See, 
e.g., Sepper, supra note 103; Reinhardt, supra note 149 (explaining who pays 
for health insurance in EB settings). Low-income workers admittedly compli-
cate the analysis. If laws require they receive benefits larger than their wages 
(or large enough to make their wages less than minimum wage laws require), 
then the employer must either pay other employees less or pay out of its own 
pocket. 
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was otherwise mine.152 My (admittedly unscientific) sense is 
that many observers perceived the Hobby Lobby case to be 
about the latter when it is conceptually about the former. The 
opaque nature of EB interventions is surely partially responsi-
ble for confusion along those lines. 
Hobby Lobby aside, confusion over EB realities seems like-
ly to generally obstruct a sensible discussion of alternatives. If 
one believes under an EB intervention that one is getting 
health insurance for free (or at any price lower than the actual 
amount of wages foregone), then one will react badly to alterna-
tives that expose that fiction.153  
Finally, EB interventions have an odd distortionary effect 
on how the problem of Good X is perceived. If the baseline 
world is particularly bad, and most people receive their Goods 
X in connection with employment, the resulting prominence of 
the practical connection between employment and Good X will 
lead many to impute a logical connection, i.e., that Good X has 
some inextricable link to employment, when in fact it does not. 
Social goods are generally social goods because we perceive 
them to be important irrespective of one’s job status. This is not 
to say that people should receive social goods free of charge; we 
may very well believe as a society that social goods should in-
corporate some requirement that able people contribute to the 
cost of providing them. But, for example, people need income 
when they cannot work because of age or disability, and they 
need health care when they are sick.154 That is true regardless 
of someone’s past employment status.155 
Providing Good X through the labor bargain is simply a 
regulatory solution to the social problems associated with Good 
X. An EB intervention should be exactly as appealing as how 
well it solves the Good X problem it purports to solve; there is 
 
 152. The ACA does not literally require that employers serve as adminis-
trators; rather, it subjects them to a penalty for not doing so. See Lederman, 
supra note 135. That matters not at all for my point. 
 153. Ironically enough, this is one of the complaints that critics of govern-
ment-provided health care interventions often make—that those who benefit 
do not know the cost of the goods being received and therefore have an unreal-
istic view of what can and cannot be provided. 
 154. The existence of a need does not necessarily imply a right to the need-
ed good, of course.  
 155. Put differently, employment is not a reliable proxy for either desert or 
need. Consider stay-at-home spouses and independent contractors who worked 
for a lifetime but can never be said to have been “employees” under the com-
mon law. They do not need old-age income any less than those who were tradi-
tionally employed. 
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no inherent benefit or necessity in providing social goods 
through employment. EB interventions define the solution, not 
the problem. 
III.  THE POWER OF EB THEORY   
EB theory is flexible and powerful. Thinkers can differ, for 
example, about why or whether there is a problem with Good X, 
about whether and how the regulated inclusion of Good X in 
the labor deal will help the problem, or about the comparative 
merits of non-EB regulatory approaches. EB theory will still be 
useful.  
Indeed, as Part III.D explains, there is good reason to 
think that EB theory will provide significant value to decision-
makers, reformers, scholars, and perhaps, in some later itera-
tion, to the public at large. Before considering the general value 
of EB theory, however, I note some specific implications of the 
theory regarding reform (Part III.A), ERISA and ACA (Part 
III.B), and unexamined assumptions we might make about cur-
rent EB and non-EB goods (Part III.C). Consideration of those 
implications is necessarily preliminary rather than comprehen-
sive. 
A. THINKING ABOUT REFORM 
1. Segregative Pushes 
An EB intervention is justified in the first instance only if 
there is some problem with Good X. What qualifies as a prob-
lem with Good X depends on one’s point of view. Most observers 
would probably agree, however, that if people are not saving 
enough for retirement, that is a problem. 
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the retire-
ment arrangements of many people will replace only a small 
percentage of their pre-retirement income. We could say that 
such a state of affairs reflects a considered James Dean-like at-
titude to highly prioritize the pleasures of today, in which case 
retirement planning patterns represent a choice and not a 
problem.156 We could also say that some people are not making 
enough today to put aside for tomorrow; if they must buy ne-
cessities today and have nothing left for tomorrow, an EB in-
 
 156. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1741 (2011) (explaining reasons individuals might not save 
enough for the future). 
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tervention is not going to help.157 But one possible explanation 
about widespread under-saving for retirement is that people 
are poor at making retirement decisions until it is too late. 
Consider now EB interventions in which Good X is retire-
ment income. The three primary rationales offered for using EB 
interventions over the baseline market were (1) the drafting of 
employers as sophisticated agents; (2) the advantage of using 
the employee group as a purchasing unit; and (3) the positive 
behavioral effects of using the labor deal as an attention-
focuser and commitment mechanism. Which seems the strong-
est point in favor of EB retirement interventions? 
Many retirement scholars believe the central problem with 
retirement income is that many people do not devote enough 
resources (whether through savings or annuity purchases) to 
fund their retirement income, as compared to their likely future 
needs.158 Concerns that individuals in the retirement income 
market will get taken advantage of, or that they will pay a 
higher price for retirement income solutions than they would if 
they were part of a group—those are problems, but they pale in 
comparison to the fact that people simply do not save enough to 
provide for a likely set of possible post-employment futures. 
A strong argument in favor of EB retirement interventions, 
accordingly, is that they alter people’s behavior with respect to 
retirement, promoting a higher level of resource commitment 
than in their absence, because, at a minimum, they remind 
people of the issue and provide administrative structures for 
committing resources to the “purchase” of retirement income. 
EB interventions also generally block the committed resources 
in question from being used by beneficiaries prior to retire-
ment, which, because of people’s inability to stick to promises 
they make only to themselves, ultimately increases the amount 
of money people have for retirement. 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics 
Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1607 (2014) (“Federal gov-
ernment policy since the 1930s has reflected the judgment that many people 
do not save enough for retirement.”); Teresa Ghilarducci, Opinion, Our Ridicu-
lous Approach to Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2012, at SR5 (noting the 
insufficient retirement savings of most American workers); see also MUNNELL 
& SUNDÉN, supra note 142 (describing retirement saving shortcomings in the 
United States); James M. Poterba, Retirement Security in an Aging Popula-
tion, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2014) (identifying the various segments of the 
population that are risk).  
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Indeed, these decisional and administrative aspects of EB 
retirement intervention (which correspond to the “natural deci-
sion point” set of rationales offered in Part II.B.2.c) seem much 
stronger than the other rationales. The comparative sophistica-
tion of employers on the substantive matters of Good X relative 
to employees provides minimal justification for an EB retire-
ment intervention. Employers are no more sophisticated in 
funding annuities or investing in the market than they are in, 
say, writing real estate mortgages. They will accordingly need 
to be heavily regulated to ensure they can and actually do keep 
retirement promises they make. Nor is there strong evidence 
that employers are striking particularly good deals with third-
party providers regarding retirement funds; whether that is be-
cause of incompetence or collusion is unclear.159 In any event, 
most employers rely heavily on outside parties to perform re-
tirement functions, and those parties also need to be regulated 
heavily. 
Consider a slightly odd counterfactual. Imagine if we lived 
in a world where individuals would appropriately commit, 
without prompting, a sufficient amount to provide for their re-
tirement, and our main worry is that such individuals would be 
exploited by providers of retirement solutions. Let’s call these 
individuals “Retirement-Focused Naifs.” 
The answer to the problem of Retirement-Focused Naifs 
(RFNs) would be to directly regulate those advisors who man-
aged the investment of their retirement monies; the answer 
would patently not be to ask RFNs to hand their retirement 
money over to their employers so that their employers could 
then interface with third-party investment managers. Not only 
is that—in terms of the overall regulation needed and the 
number of parties regulated—a more complicated solution, it 
increases the likelihood that RFNs would then be exploited by 
their employers or disserved because their employers would be 
incompetent agents. No one thinks involving employers as pur-
chasing agents in the acquisition of things such as cars or 
houses will reliably improve outcomes. That does not funda-
mentally change when the good is “retirement income.” 
Of course, most observers do not believe we live in a world 
of RFNs—they believe that individuals are unsophisticated 
about retirement and also unfocused.160 The employer link in 
 
 159. See supra note 117 (citing sources questioning the cost and perfor-
mance of EB retirement plans). 
 160. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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the chain can be a nontrivial part of pushing people to properly 
focus, i.e., to be sufficiently retirement-interested.  
The RFN example helps narrow down what EB interven-
tions may be good for: the segregative push.161 A segregative 
push is when, in an EB world, the employer segregates wages 
that can only be used by the employee for Good X. Segregative 
pushes may, generally speaking, capture the appeal of EB in-
terventions while limiting their downsides. They are, of course, 
not complete solutions, because they do not solve the problem of 
the employee making bad choices with respect to Good X. 
2. EB Conduit Systems 
Only in rare circumstances will segregated pushes be 
enough, because they are incomplete solutions to a Good X 
market that has other infirmities. Good X may be too compli-
cated for individuals to reliably obtain desirable deals, or the 
Good X individual market may be too expensive for many indi-
viduals to reliably participate in; segregative pushes do not re-
mediate those problems. A segregated push needs a back-end, 
i.e., a regulated market in which employees can obtain Good X. 
Option one, of course, is for that regulated market to be an EB 
market. Option two is for that regulated market to be a non-EB 
market. 
Option one is problematic for the reasons articulated 
above: when employers are involved in the delivery of Good X, 
either as agents or providers, employees are subject to in-
creased risk of incompetence or exploitation. EB interventions 
also lead to opacity problems. More subtly, the inclusion of em-
ployers in this way leads to regulatory fragility and opportun-
ism. But let us also assume that the regulatory value of an EB 
segregative push is high, because it is difficult to replicate its 
salutary commitment effects in a non-EB market and because 
other objections disqualify the regulatory solution of simply 
providing Good X through governmental program.162 How might 
 
 161. Several years ago, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler wrote a book en-
titled Nudge. Most contemporary readers will have heard of it. The book de-
fined nudges as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s be-
havior . . . without forbidding any options or significantly changing their 
economic incentives . . . . Nudges are not mandates.” RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 6 (2008). That is somewhat different than the con-
cept I describe here as a segregative push. A segregative push can be coercive, 
and it could be a mandate. It can also be accompanied on the back-end by a 
nudge, i.e., an easily alterable default choice, but it does not have to be. 
 162. I am not saying I believe (or do not believe) that; I am assuming it to 
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we preserve the value of segregative pushes without the less 
desirable aspects of EB interventions?  
The answer is what we might call an EB “conduit” system. 
An EB conduit system is simple in concept. It is an EB inter-
vention where the primary role of the employer is to transpar-
ently withhold and transfer some amount of wages to an ac-
count that the employee can only spend in a regulated non-EB 
market for Good X.163 
EB conduit systems use the employer as an administrative 
convenience to require purchases of Good X but otherwise rely 
on a regulated non-EB market to address the market imperfec-
tions that bedevil Good X.164 Such interventions would dispel 
the opacity that surrounds more complicated EB interventions 
and make employees aware of how much they are paying for 
Good X. They also tie the provision of Good X to wages, which 
imposes an indirect market constraint on the unsubsidized 
price people can pay for Good X. Subsidies may be necessary for 
Good X purchases, although they would be more transparent in 
the conduit context. 
EB conduit systems do not require employers to be sophis-
ticated about Good X or provide them with opportunities to ex-
ploit employees. Much of the mischief attributable to EB inter-
ventions arises from complexity, discretion, and regulatory 
fragility.165 Conduit systems avoid these problems by limiting 
employer discretion to the contribution question (with contribu-
tion mandates eliminating employer discretion on even that 
question).166 
 
be the case for clarity of discussion. 
 163. One could also imagine a government-conduit system, i.e., a 
segregative push into a quasi-market essentially run by the government, such 
as the United Kingdom’s NEST program. See Who Runs NEST, NAT’L EMP. 
SAVINGS TR., https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/NestWeb/public/ 
aboutnestcorporation/contents/who-runs-nest.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) 
(explaining how the NEST retirement program works). Whether such a 
scheme is politically palatable here is a separate question. 
 164. Another advantage of the conduit model is comparative. One worry 
with relying on the direct government provision of Good X is that government 
can change its mind (by engaging in “entitlement reform”) about providing X. 
In contrast, if X is privately funded, that money belongs to the beneficiary.  
 165. Who determines the amount of monies to be segregated depends in 
part upon whether the employer, as influenced by employees, will make deci-
sions that are optimal or near optimal for the average person. Because the 
amount is a simpler decision, it may be more suited to employer discretion 
than other Good X decisions.  
 166. Ten years ago, Professor Edward Zelinsky described a paradigm shift 
in American thinking about social goods associated with employee benefits 
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And conduit systems suggest one legal feature that em-
ployers should very much like: if the employer role is simply to 
withhold and transfer some amount into an account the em-
ployee can spend in a regulated, non-EB market for Good X, an 
employer should have no liability beyond having to successfully 
transfer the promised amount. If the employer has some role in 
selecting the default version of Good X that will be bought with 
the transferred funds, then some residual liability for the em-
ployer could be appropriate. 
B. THINKING ABOUT ERISA & ACA 
ERISA. When an idea is instantiated, other versions of it 
become counterfactual. The instantiated version can exert un-
due influence on abstract thinking about the general. Some 
versions of ideas, in other words, dominate by being. Something 
like this has happened with ERISA. EB interventions encom-
pass vastly more than ERISA, but the latter has come to shape 
mainstream and scholarly considerations of what EB interven-
tions generally are.167 
This is somewhat understandable. The statute’s particu-
lars are so technical and arid that only an intrepid few have 
dared consider the legislation at length, let alone familiarize 
themselves with its history or embark on a theoretic treatment 
of statutory counterfactuals. Nonetheless, one immediate ad-
vantage of EB theory is that it denies the ERISA-EB equiva-
lence, and provides a nontechnical framework for (1) distin-
guishing the concept of an EB intervention from ERISA; (2) 
cataloguing ERISA’s successes and shortcomings; and (3) imag-
ining counterfactual EB interventions that might work better. 
EB theory also suggests the outlines of a unifying story 
about the statute’s surprisingly turbulent life: how the absence 
 
and government programs. He explained that the country was undergoing a 
move from “defined benefit” approaches (where the entitlement is defined in 
terms of the Good X to be received) to “defined contribution” approaches 
(where the entitlement is defined in terms of the funds contributed to pay for 
Good X). Zelinsky, supra note 45, at 455–58. The wisdom of such a move has 
since been debated extensively. For those who like segregative pushes, the “de-
fined contribution paradigm” is appealing, but it leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether the market that beneficiaries are being pushed into will be 
regulated enough to solve the problems of Good X. Conduit systems are the an-
swer for observers who think not.  
 167. Commentators, including thoughtful judges, struggled mightily to 
make sense of ERISA, in essence attempting to explain the statute rather 
than develop an antecedent explanation of what an EB intervention is, could 
be, or should be.  
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of a satisfactory alternative channel for Good X exerted a pow-
erful deflationary pressure on the statute’s ability to protect 
employees. Because of the moral and financial importance of 
the things it regulates—retirement, health care, disability 
compensation, etc.—ERISA has been litigated before the Su-
preme Court routinely, and has also been the subject of exten-
sive scholarly consideration and controversy.168  
ERISA, for all its infamous enormity and sprawl, was a 
wildly incomplete solution to the problems of the Goods X it 
hoped to regulate. It made no meaningful effort to regulate 
non-EB versions of pensions, retirement accounts, or health in-
surance, yet it imposed a substantial burden on employers with 
regard to those subjects. 
As such, those charged with interpreting and applying 
ERISA essentially always faced a choice between ERISA world 
and the baseline world. Efforts to improve ERISA were 
regulatorily fragile because of the implicit threat by employers 
that they would move to the next worse option if regulated too 
heavily, i.e., from pensions to retirement accounts to no retire-
ment benefits at all. The situation was even worse for health 
care. Because there essentially was no functional individual 
market for health insurance, and because the nature of the 
health insurance promise is volatile, regulatory action disfavor-
ing employers—had it led to a reduction in the offering of EB 
health insurance—would have left large numbers of people un-
insured. 
EB theory makes plain and develops the untold portion of 
the oft-invoked tale about ERISA’s tension between promoting 
voluntary benefit plans and protecting employees,169 namely: 
that those urging the importance of the former are going to win 
most battles when the non-EB alternative for Good X is awful. 
An “ERISA world” only one peppercorn better than the baseline 
world is still, after all, a better outcome than the baseline 
world. For judges and agencies to not take heed of this reality 
would have been naïve. And Congress’s failure to realize the 
 
 168. See supra note 4 (citing ERISA cases the Supreme Court has decided 
in the last ten years). ERISA scholarship is rich and expansive. A good start-
ing point is Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Con-
tradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988), which is 
a classic in the literature. 
 169. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004) (noting ERISA’s 
“careful balancing between ensuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights 
under a plan and the encouragement of the creation of such plans” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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tilted playing field it was creating made ERISA’s broad 
preemptive language a rolling calamity, because it limited the 
set of legislative actors who could fix the problem to one: Con-
gress.170 
Had there been a robust, alternative market for Good X 
beyond an EB market, the resolution of ERISA’s controversies 
could have taken a very different shape.171 The absence of a 
palatable alternative for Goods X is a necessary and common 
theme of any story of ERISA. 
ACA. From an EB perspective, the ACA’s conceptual moti-
vation was simple, however tortured its execution. For those 
not covered by EB health insurance, the ACA aimed to create 
another Good X option: the expansion of Medicaid for the poor, 
and a stable, subsidized, comprehensible individual market for 
health insurance for everyone else.172 Put slightly differently, it 
solved the problem of Good X (where Good X = health insur-
ance) by providing, as an alternative to an EB intervention, ei-
ther (1) government provision of Good X or (2) a regulated non-
EB market for Good X. That is a straightforward application of 
EB theory. 
If the ACA created a regulated non-EB market for Good X, 
why would it attempt to preserve the EB intervention? And by 
“preserve,” I mean more than “not prohibit,” I mean “take some 
affirmative steps to perpetuate.” Imagine two alternatives: 
first, a regulatory regime that offers both a regulated EB mar-
ket and a regulated non-EB market, but regulatorily favors nei-
ther. Imagine, second, a regulatory regime that offers both a 
regulated EB market and a regulated non-EB market, but pro-
vides some regulatory advantage to EB market participants. 
The ACA resembles the second (with the most prominent ex-
amples being the requirement that large employers pay a tax if 
they do not offer EB health insurance and the lack of preferen-
 
 170. ERISA’s preemptive scope—both formally and in its indirect effects—
is extremely broad. See Maher & Pathak, supra note 51, at 284–91 (explaining 
the breadth of ERISA preemption). 
 171. Admittedly, the results may not have changed, because some judges 
may have negative views about additional legal rules in virtually any setting. 
See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Lit-
igation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (explaining and defining the hostility of the 
Rehnquist Court to litigation in a wide variety of substantive contexts). 
 172. See supra Part I.C (“[T]he intent of the Act was clear: it aimed to cre-
ate an accessible, affordable, and stable market for individuals seeking health 
insurance.”).  
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tial tax treatment for non-poor employees who purchase their 
own health insurance).173 Why did the ACA promote, to some 
degree, the continued existence of EB health insurance? 
Various explanations for the ACA’s preservation and pref-
erence for EB interventions have been offered, usually on polit-
ical or tax grounds. One political argument was that not ad-
vantaging EB interventions would lead to employers dropping 
plans, which would anger voters who wanted assurances that 
health reform would allow them to keep their current plan.174 
Another is that those who seek to change EB health insurance 
need tread carefully to avoid being tarred (and politically iso-
lated) as a radical.175 The tax argument is that the ACA’s subsi-
dy scheme is constructed such that a failure to preserve EB in-
terventions would drive many people onto the subsidized 
exchanges, thus increasing the cost of reform to the federal 
government.176 
 
 173. See supra Part I.C and accompanying notes (explaining features of the 
ACA). 
 174. This argument recently played out in the political flap over President 
Obama’s “promise” that people could keep their plans, which was not literally 
true, and caused a flurry of news coverage about people unhappy with the 
President. See, e.g., Lisa Myers & Hannah Rappleye, White House Knew Mil-
lions Could Not Keep Plans Under Obamacare, CNBC (Oct. 29, 2013), http:// 
www.cnbc.com/id/101150855# (discussing political fallout over the cancellation 
of certain policies that failed to comply with the ACA). 
 175. See Ross Douthat, Opinion, A Hidden Consensus on Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2013, at SR12 (suggesting a consensus that EB health insur-
ance is not a good idea, but that political calculations favor its continued exist-
ence). 
 176. See, e.g., Peter Ubel, The Problem with Obamacare’s 50 Employee Cut-
off, FORBES, (Mar. 24 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/05/24/ 
the-problem-with-obamacares-50-employee-cutoff (“[T]he subsidy fixes one 
problem, but creates another: because the government is going to help people 
pay for private insurance, that gives employers an even greater incentive to 
pull out of the health insurance market while relying upon the government to 
pick up the slack.”). 
Assertions such as this need to be appropriately qualified. Currently all 
employer-based health insurance is not taxed, which deprives the government 
of revenue equal to the cost of the health insurance times the effective mar-
ginal tax rate of the recipients. Assume employment-based health insurance is 
abolished tomorrow. If employers did not offer health insurance, in the long 
run wages would need to rise to offset that reduction in compensation, and 
those wages would be subject to taxation. Alternatively, if employers did not 
raise wages but simply increased profits, that would be taxed. Only if the sub-
sidies available to people participating in the exchange exceeded one of those 
numbers would the elimination of EB health insurance be a net revenue loss.  
Some observers are careful to qualify their statements on the issue. See, 
e.g., David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of 
Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable 
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Non-political and non-tax explanations for the ACA’s pro-
EB character have been less forthcoming. That is not surpris-
ing, because the legislation’s pro-EB bias was a questionable 
(although not indefensible) policy choice.177  
In insurance terms, there is little to recommend a collec-
tion of group markets (corresponding to employers) over a 
mandated, no-underwriting individual market. The former re-
quires some underwriting for groups—not underwriting within 
the group, but underwriting for the group, because groups vary 
in their risk profile. A group of accountants present different 
risks than a group of truckers, and small groups are more vola-
tile than large ones.178 A unified individual market requires the 
insurer to simply issue a community policy to all.179 An ideal 
version of the ACA market (one unified insurance market) 
serves as a better group corrective than an ideal version of the 
EB market (a collection of groups with varying risk characteris-
tics). Why did ACA perpetuate the arguably worse market? 
It is not because of a worry that insureds will be unable to 
navigate the health insurance market outside the EB setting; 
the exchanges were intended to make that choice simple and 
transparent. Nor is it because EB policies are necessarily better 
than the policies to be had on the individual exchanges. Indeed, 
one particularly puzzling feature of the ACA is that it did not, 
and does not, require large employers to offer the statutorily-
required “essential health benefits” required of small group and 
individual policies.180 So large employers may offer narrower 
coverage—and some do.181 Put differently: it may now be easier 
to be exploited in the EB market than in the non-EB market. 
 
Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 692–93 
(2012) (“Maintaining the previous system of employer-sponsored coverage for 
lower-income taxpayers was considered important for realizing the ACA’s defi-
cit-reducing potential because additional lower-income employees qualifying 
for the Exchange subsidies would drive up the budgetary cost of the Exchange 
subsidies.”). Others are not. 
 177. Some of the EB-bias predates the ACA, e.g., the preferential tax 
treatment of EB health purchases. See Utz, supra note 58, at 1232–33. But the 
ACA could have altered that scheme.  
 178. See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 53, at 1943 (discussing the 
higher risk-volatility of small groups). 
 179. The ACA permits premium variation based on a small set of factors, 
including age and tobacco use. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 180. Id. § 300gg-6(a) (providing that only individual and small group plans 
must provide “essential health benefits”). 
 181. See supra note 59 (explaining how the ACA permits the issuance of 
narrow policies). 
  
2016] EMPLOYMENT-BASED ANYTHING 1319 
 
Given the above, regulatorily favoring the EB market—
whether through the spectacularly cumbersome “employer 
mandate,” by tax-disadvantaging non-EB purchases, or via the 
application of some other regulatory wrinkle—is under EB the-
ory presumptively unjustified, or at least highly debatable. 
Perhaps one can argue that the government was unsure of the 
quality of the non-EB market it was creating, and wanted to 
ensure it was desirable before undoing regulatory features that 
unnaturally preserved the imperfect but more stable EB mar-
ket. That may very well be so; the inclusion of reinsurance and 
risk adjustment provisions in the ACA suggests some concern 
about precisely this issue.182 That raises the question: if the 
non-EB market proves stable, can we expect pressure from fu-
ture reformers to eliminate the pro-EB features of existing law? 
The answer: almost certainly. And so one hopes that dur-
ing future reform discussions hysteria will play less of a role 
than it did the first time around. Perhaps—given certain statu-
tory particulars of the ACA—the non-EB market it creates is 
going to be worse than the EB market, and Congress was wise 
to favor the latter. The point is that it makes little sense to as-
sume that conclusion, absent a detailed consideration of which 
parts of the ACA undermine the comparative appeal of the non-
EB market it creates. An extensive analysis of the statute’s key 
implementation features, so as to conduct a sober comparison 
between ACA EB and ACA non-EB, is not a simple matter, but 
it is a necessary one, and a task we should hope occurs before 
the next generation of health reform discussions.183 
C. THINKING ABOUT NON-EB GOODS 
An interesting future application of EB theory will be to 
use it to explain why certain socially desirable goods about 
which individuals frequently make poor decisions have not 
been widely offered as EB goods. Thorough treatments of this 
type—as to certain goods, or classes of goods—are articles of 
their own, but let me suggest here a modest thought experi-
ment. It may bring into sharper focus hidden assumptions 
 
 182. See generally Mark A. Hall, The Three Types of Reinsurance Created 
by Federal Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1168 (2010) (explaining the ACA’s 
various reinsurance mechanisms). 
 183. And we should hope so even if politics means the right answer will 
never be translated into policy. Truth unenacted is preferable to truth unrec-
ognized. 
  
1320 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1257 
 
many of us may have regarding EB interventions for certain 
goods.  
Imagine that there is no public system of primary educa-
tion, but instead an employment-based primary education sys-
tem, where employers, using the foregone wages of their em-
ployees, pay an education “premium” to a local school, which 
obtains its revenues based largely on tuition (supplemented by 
perhaps a very modest government subsidy). Employees with-
out children can opt-out of the system. 
Such an approach seems, to modern tastes, unpalatable. 
Among the many reasons why: society believes education is too 
important a good to provide only to the children of the em-
ployed. Put in EB theory terms, an EB education approach fails 
because it does not provide universal education, and society has 
concluded universal education is a precondition for a prosper-
ous and fair society. Moreover, even with respect to those whom 
an EB education system would educate, we would have pro-
found concerns about the influence of employers on the terms of 
the education bargain. Education should be provided on terms 
consistent with the public good, not on terms that match em-
ployer preference. Now query the degree to which the same ar-
guments against EB education apply to EB retirement, health 
care, or disability compensation.184  
D. THINKING ABOUT TOMORROW  
EB theory asks an organized set of questions about the ap-
peal of any EB intervention. Obviously answering those ques-
tions involves judgments or priors on which observers can disa-
gree. But EB theory is applicable to all Goods X, can fairly 
easily disaggregate questions on which persons do and do not 
agree, and can resolve comparisons both among EB interven-
tions and between EB and non-EB regulatory approaches.  
 
 184. It is not a perfect analogy, of course. But it is an interesting way to 
think about the question. Unemployment insurance (UI) is also an interesting 
case. UI is a specific version of wage replacement income, namely, wage re-
placement for a job lost involuntarily. It is not overly difficult to imagine an 
EB intervention for UI. Cf. Michael B. Rappaport, The Private Provision of 
Unemployment Insurance, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 61 (imagining a private system 
for UI). The group corrective and behavioral case for EB UI is, at the very 
least, colorable. But it seems that concerns about employers (or the insurers 
they retain) negotiating or administering UI in a socially undesirable way are 
sufficiently acute to constitute a very strong case for the current governmen-
tal, non-EB provision of UI.  
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From a scholarly and policymaking perspective, the appeal 
of a common framework requires little elaboration. It elimi-
nates the need to reinvent the wheel every time society consid-
ers a proposed EB intervention or a change thereto. It better 
situates decision-makers to determine which particular regula-
tory features an EB intervention for Good X should have, which 
should in turn facilitate the crafting (or debate over the craft-
ing) of the implementing statute or regulations.185 It also, at 
least for purposivist judges, can help resolve doctrinal and in-
terpretative disputes that arise after the fact. 
It is far from clear how and why the national conversation 
develops as it does. But some ideas are better developed, and 
more succinctly expressed, than others. For example, Ameri-
cans are today well familiar with stripped down versions of the 
debates between market and government solutions. EB inter-
ventions, on the other hand, occupy a very strange place in the 
national consciousness. They are familiar to so many but only 
vaguely understood as nebulous arrangements involving some 
unspecified nexus between a job and Good X. One explanation 
for such fuzzy popular treatment is that no coherent account 
exists even at the scholarly level.  
Long overdue is an accessible framework for understand-
ing a crucial tool of American social policy—the EB interven-
tion. Admittedly, this Article offers a comprehensive theoretical 
account of EB interventions, not a catchy vocabulary ready to 
penetrate the national conversation. But the task must start 
somewhere. 
  CONCLUSION   
Existing scholarship concerning EB interventions has been 
largely good-centric or statute-centric, avoiding the task of an-
tecedent inquiry. Those approaches, while of considerable use-
fulness, are incomplete and possess limited potential to trans-
cend the technical. This Article argues that EB interventions 
have important recurring characteristics that, when recog-
nized, permit disciplined thinking about their pitfalls and po-
tential across goods and statutes. Nor, importantly, does the 
unifying theory offered here conflict with the rich existing 
 
 185. For example, supporting a particular EB intervention because one be-
lieves a particular Good X needs a group corrective is a very different matter 
than supporting an EB intervention because of one’s faith in the sophistication 
and agency of employers. One believing the former will conclude a different set 
of EB regulations is necessary than one believing the latter. 
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scholarship on the many specific issues it subsumes—quite the 
opposite. EB theory situates that work within a larger, more 
powerful frame, one that has important implications for ques-
tions of research, policy, and narrative. 
EB theory is sui generis; it deliberately does not use the 
“as” expedient of describing EB interventions as a manifesta-
tion of some other recognized concept. Indeed, EB interventions 
are likely under-theorized and misunderstood in part because 
they cannot be usefully described as the manifestation of some 
pre-existing unitary principle. But that does not mean their 
theoretical skeletons should remain forever obscure. 
 
 
